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In the Supi'eme Court of the State of Utah
. EAST BENCH IRRIGATION CO.,
et al.
Respondents,
vs.

No. 7990

STATE OF UTAH, et al.
.Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This action is a consolidation of twenty-three
separate actions filed in the District Court of the Sixth
Judical District in the County of Garfield. All are
appeals from the decisions of the State Engineer of
the State of Utah· denying the twenty-three separate
application~ for permanent change. of point of diversion,
place and nature of use of water of Sevier River in Garfield and Piute Counties.
This appeal is of major importance. The decision
here will affect all of the principal water users along the
225 mile_ length of the main channel of the Sevier
River. The plaintiffs and respondents comprise the
prinicipal water users in Panguitch and Circle Valleys
and the defendants and appellants are all of the major
canal and reservoir companies below those Valleys.
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Respondents between the 23rd day of S~pte~ber,
1948, ~~~q the ~1th d~y- of Septe~ber, ~~4:~, f~l~?- ~~~
the State Engin~er ·23 applications for authority to
change the point of diversion, place and nature of use
of the waters of the Seyier ~~y~r (fls. ~x~. ~ a~q ~).
Included therein wer~ applications for authority to take
wat~rs frqm the Sevier River and anply them to 5000
acres of undeveloped raw sagebr~sh land fa~ r~mov~q
from the river. the appl1cations recited. that it was the
intention of the respondents to build a reservoir near
Hatch Town, Garfield County, Utah, and there store
the waters of the river until released at such time and
in such amounts as respondents might determine, for use
upon the 5000 acres of land or for use
upon lands then
.under cultivation- along the· river~ or ·for both such
pses. Protests to the
app~ic~tions we:r:~ fileq by the
~
~
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qefendant ca11:~h irr~?ation ~~d res~ryo~r. compa~~es.
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Several hearings were held by the State Engineer
for the purpose
of receiving evidence for and against
'/'
the granting of the applications. On March 16, 1951,
Joseph M. '·Tracy, State Engineer of the State of Utah;
rejected each of' the· applications
'' ... for the reason that it would constitute an enlargement' of the original right, adversely eri ~t
existing rights, and by reason of indefinite
:peri~q o_f ~~.a.nge, impose an ~:mpossible proble~
of distribution on the Water Commissioner.,,
(Sta~~ Engine~r-'s Exhibit 1, application No.
a-2372)
· ·
·
·
~ .
,
.
In q.u~ cours~ the plaintiffs appealed to the District
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Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of
Utah, in and for Garfield. c·ounty. Th~J co~phiinfs ·,a:Fe
simple in form and consist of five short paragr'aphs,
alle~ng that a re~iew is sought by th~ plaintiffs of'the
decision .of the State Engi~eer, Joseph ·M.· Tr:acy ;; ·thiat
plaintiffs filed applications r'or a .permal1~~nt ·change ·~f
point of diversiori to permit plaintiffs tot change the man~e·r- of use of water ftom ~direct flow to a direct flow a~d
storage right in a reservoir' ·to be constr~cte~l; th~t th~
State Engineer hea~d the ~pplieatio.ns 'aft~r 'du~ notice
and. there~iter de~ied the applicatio~s, and tha·t pl~iri
tiffs ~ ~ppeal fro~ the decis~o~· of' ·the'i Slate· Engine~~
and request the court to re~ew 'the applications. . . .'
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P11rsuant. t~ ~tlnul~t~on of t~e p~~t~~~' fh.~ cplfl;t
~ad~ a~ o:r:q~~ c~n~9liq~ttng t~~ t~enty-t:qr~e ~a~~~ ~:g.tp

qne action. Tp~ q~fe~da~t.~ ~~~~ered, a~l~ging t4~t th~
p-~:op~sal~ q~ t¥e pla~n ti+f~ !V8~l4 g~~at~y @p~i~ t.~~
~~steq rig¥ts ~~ t~~ (}~f~:p.~a:nt~; tl}at appr~v~l of t~e
applicatiqn~
~<?~~~ c~~st~tTI-t~ a~ Ulllawful ~¥la.rg~J!l~~t
,
of the rights of th~ plaintiffs; that the waters Rf the
Sevier River had been ther~tofore fully app:r;opriate~
a~d that to ~pply waterl f~r
~ i~rlgation prtrp·~~es o~· ~~w
•. •
land wouldr mcrease
the cqnsumptive us~, change the
, ,;
tin.~e and quantity of the return flo-w: to the riyer a~d
u~~et the entire river system as it h~d be~n ~~ini~ter~J
for many years~ by the Stat~
Engineer
through the
! ' ' •;
~
River Commissioners.
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The defendants also alleged that there had been
a general adjudication of the right to the use of the
I.
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waters of the Sevier River, known as the Cox Decree,
and that in such general adjudication the parties and the
court all re~ognized. that the use of the water rights
of the river were to be limited by geographical and
climatic conditions· that the construction and operation
'
of the proposed Hatch
Town reservoir would deprive
the defendants and their stockholders of waters which
the defendants had appropriated, stored and used for
more than thiro/ years, and that ·the defendants would
suffer great and irreparable injury if the Hatch Town
Reservoir were constructed and water impounded therein; that the plaintiffs had failed to use for more than
twenty years the water that they now claim to have
been awarded to them by the Cox Decree. It was further
:1.\lleged by the defendants that the diversion and storage
applied for by the plaintiffs would be incapable of
administration and would impose a burden in the distribution of the waters of the river impossible to discharge without injuring numerous defendants.
The case came on for trial before the Hon. Lewis
Jones,, District Judge, and thereafter the court made its
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree, approving on condition the applications and reversing the order
of the. State Engineer.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

History of the River
The Sevier River is unique in many respects. It is
the longest river system completely contained in the
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State of Utah. It rises in Ka~e and Garfield Counties
and flows in a northerly direction through Garfield,
Piute, Sevier, Sanpete and Juab Counties, until it
emerges on the Sevier desert near the town of Leamington in Millard County, Utah. At this point it courses in
a southwesterly direction in Millard County and is
entirely consumed before reaching Sevier Lake into
which it once flowed. From its source to Sevier Lake,
the distance is approximately 225 miles. (Defs. Ex. 54,.
pages 10-11)
During its entire course, until it reaches the Sevier
Desert in Millard County, the river flows through comparatively narrow valleys between two mountain ranges;
the valleys sloping on each side toward the main channel of the river. This results in return seepage ·to the
river where the waters ~re again used by appropriators
further down the stream.
It was apparent soon ·after the irrigation use of
the Sevier River began that much of the water diverted
from the stream and applied to contiguous lands soon
found its way back into the river. This fact is of prime
importance to the users of the stream because the return water is available for rediversion at places lower
down the river. So marked is this tendency to return
seepage that not far below tight dams that divert the
entire flow of the river during the irrigation season,
the river contains at the lower p·oint as much water as
it does above the dam.s. Thus, under present conditions
there is a quantity of water available for irrigation
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of lands along the river's length greatly 1n excess of
the obs.erve<f flow a.t any o~e point on the river. (Defs.
Ex. 54,-Pages 68~69) ·· .: ·
·\
!

t

+t has ~een said rep~atedly, ~~d ~s p~qpabl~ tru~,
that the waters of the Sevier Riv~r are1 mqre cq~plet~ly
u.tiliz,ed f~~ . i;~igati~n th~u th.p-~e- of
otne:r riveJ; i~
t:P.e ~orld.·. Yet, ~t- .;~s re~ognized as ea.J;lY ~~ 18~9 t4~t
the 1Vater ~11pply <?f th~ Se~er ~iy~r ~~- ~~s11f~~~~~11,t
for all of the fertile lands within the reach pf the :river
or its tributaries. (Defs. Ex. 54, Page 1) T~~ a~ou~~ ~f
arable land to which water might be applied by proposed canals is greatly in excess of the' surface 'water
supply (Defs. Ex. 54, Page · 65). Because of su~h
shortage,' the inevitable result has been over-development of cleared lands and. continuous litigation of water
rights. Prior to the entry of the Cox Decree on ·November 30, 1936, more. than forty-five separate Decrees were
entered, defining water rights in the Sevier Lake Basirt.
(D~fs. Ex. 54, Page 66),
L
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Prior to the Cox Decree the two principal Decrees
were the Higgins Decree entered in 1901, defin'ing the
r
rights on the lower zone of the river (administering the
waters of the river below the intake
the westview
Canal in -Sanpete County to the lowest diversion on the
Sevier River), . and the Morse Decree of 1906, which set
forth the rights on the upper zone (above the dam of the
Vermillion Irrigation Company just east of Redmond in
Sevier County to the uper source of the Sevier River).
(Defs. Ex. 54. Page 67)
f

, 1

•

•

,
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Both of these decrees were entered prior to the
construction of. the Sevier Bridge and Piute Reservoirs
and were therefore concerned with the prilnary, .direct
flow rights. In August 1902, c~rtain of ·the defendants
appropriated tb.e waters and filed on a reservoir site
in Juab County, Utah, and began the c~nstr~ction of a
dam at what is now }{nown ~s Sevier Bridge. The dam
and reser~~ir were designed to place under irrigation a
large acr~age of undeveloped la~d in Millard County,
Utah, and in all more than 70,000 ·acres of land have
~een reclaimed and plac~4 u~d~r cultivation by reason
of
the. waters
so appropriated and impounded in th~
!f· ·
.; . · ·
Sevier Bridge Reservoir..· The reservoir in· 1912 was
completed to holdf i water
at
its 60-foot contour
level.
., - "':
; .: j ·, '
f
.'
)
In 1913 plans were app:r;oved' for enlarging the r~servoiJ;
to a height of 90 feet, and this Work
Wa~ COPJ.pleted J"Q.ne.
.... :· ..
;
17, 1916. The reservoir was built entirely with p'rivate
funds and has a capacity· of 235,962 acre feet. ·It is
owned jointly by the Defendants; Deseret I'rrigation
Company, Melville Irrigation Company, Delta Canai
Company, Abraham Irrigation Company and the Central Utah Water Company.
The Piute Reservoir was commenced in 1906 by
the Ottgr Creek Re.~ervoir C~~pany at a .site in Piute
County nea~ the town 'of M~rysv~le~ It was ~omplet~d
by the State of Utah after the State purchased the water
rights an:d reser~oir sit~ fro~ the Otter Creek R~servoir
·Company. Sto~age be~an in the year ~910, a.nd the
reservoir was ~ully completed about 1912. ~he reservo~~
h~s an actual capacity oi 84,000 acre feet, but its usable
.

...

:

'

•

i- , -, .:._ ~

• i.

.:

:·.

.... ~

;'

' -

~.

j

.

l

..

•

'

'

'

~

•

_-

.;.

'

t

'·

·-

...

•

.

;;

-

-

-~

:

,·

'

•

f

•

: '·. .

~

~

~

:

{

'·

'\.

.

'

'•

' :

•• :

.• f ~

'

~ .

'

~:: t '·

'

I

•

l ·

::.

.

•

•

'

' '

:

)

~

•

~-

7

0

..

}

\.

.

~·

l

:·

•. ,·I ·:

'

/

,

1

I

.

...

!

·

·

~ ..~

~·

~

•

'

'

•

, /

I'"

)

<·I

f

:

•

:, .

'

.

f

..

:

.

~

•

~

. -~-- .

.

·

.

; ; ' !

·.

: ,''

.

~

-~ ,,~·

• ·11

•

.

~

-~

• ,'. 1 ., ,

'

'

·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•·.

...

~~

•

:

•.•

.

r ·••

8
capacity at the present time 1s approximately 74,000
acre feet. (Defs. Ex. 54, Page 125)
As a result of the appropriation of such waters and
the construction of said reservoirs numerous communities wholly dependent upon the waters therein have
been established in Sevier, Sanpete and Millard Counties, and the waters. so impounded and appropriated
constitute the sole support of thousands of inhabitants
of those counties.
The Hatch Town Reservoir in Garfield County was
begun in 1906 by the State Land Board and was completed in the Spring of 1909. The dam failed and washed
out during May, 1914, and has not been rebuilt. In effect
the. Hatch Town projec~ since 1914 has heen abandoned.
(Defs. Ex. 54, Page 156)
The Higgins Decree of 1901 and the Morse Decree
of 1906 became inadequate to meet the conditions that
had grown more complex by new developments along the
river requiring water. The State Engineer, in connection
'vith the Federal Geological Survey, recognized the need
for additional study of the flow of the river. During
the years 1914 and 1915, under the direction of the
District Engineer of the Federal Geological Survey, more
than seventy gaging stations were established along
the Sevier River and its tributaries, and Annual Reports
were made, covering these measurements by the Engineer. Two of these gaging stations have special significance in relation to the present action. The first is the
Hatch Gaging Station which is situated at the town of
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Hatch in Garfield County and with the exception of the
Hatch Town Corporation and John Yardley is above
the diversion point of each of the respondents. The
second is the gaging station near Kingston which is
located on the south fork (we are only concerned with
the south fork in this action) of the Sevier River and is
below the diversions of all the respondents. The water
passing the Kingston Gaging Station represents the
'vater from the south fork of the Sevier River received
by the appellants. (Defs. Ex. 1)
The Cox Decree
The case of Richlands Irrigation Company vs. West
l"iew Irrigation Company, et al., was a general adjudication of the waters of the Sevier River and finally resulted
in publication of the Cox Decree in 1936. The general
adjudication decree was a stipulated decree and no
appeal was taken therefrom although it is referred to in
a number of other cases. The case was filed in 1916,
and on March 1st of that year, the DisJrict Court of the
Fifth Judical District in Millard County appointed a
Water Commissioner to direct the investigational work
in connection with the general adjudication of all the
water rights of the River and its tributaries. All matters
pertaining to the work being performed by the Water
Commissioner ".,.ere in 1920 reliquished by the court to
the State Engineer, who, under the provisions of
Chapter 67, Session Laws of Utah-1919, was required to
make a Proposed Determination of all the rights to the
use of the water from the Sevier River system. (Def~.
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~X. 65,

Pages 67-68)

Pur~~ant_ .to thi~ relinquis~men~,

~eorge :M:. Bacon, ihe State Eiigine~r, com~leted. in
~925 iiis Pro:Po,sed :Dete~ni.l.iiat~on ,o£_ ~he j ~at~r. rights
the Se~!er River system
early in ~~2? filed this
compiiattori with the bistric~ court <?£ ~he Fi~th Judicial
Pfstrict in M!tlard d~~nty. (Defs. Ex. 52) This exha~s
do~uinent como:rily known as ''Bacon's Bibie'' and
·largely the basis
which the stipulated Cox Decree
--:. \·: '-· -:)
-- ·• 5 was entered.
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The General Adjudication Decree ~ape by J udg~
Cox November 30, 1936, divid~d the .right to the use of
tlie waters of the river irito two main classes: First,
primary or direct flow rights, arid second' storage rights.
It also divided such rights i~to defiliite specified perioas
of time. In general th-e di~ect flow or primary rights
exist during the irrigation sea-son, that is from April
lst to September 30th of each year, and the storage
rights exist from October 1st to September 30th following. While storage rights exist throughout the twelvemonth period, actual storage largely takes place from
October 1st to March 1st. The Cox Decree gives to the
Piute Reservoir and the Sevier Bridge Reservoir all
of the water of the river :riot specifically awarded to the
direct flow rights. At page i85, the dec~ee provides :
( _ ''.IT

IS FURTHER . ORDERED, APJUDGED and DECREED that the Piute Reservoir, and Irrigatio~ Company . . . . (and) the
owners of the S~VIer Bridge Reservoir are the
owners of the right to store and use all of the
waters yielded by the said Sevier River for satis-
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fying ,their rights under .(storage applications
made from 1902 to 19i2.) ''
(The Cox Decree is a printed black volume and is
entitled ''Decree adjudicating the Sevier. River Syste~,; ~nd 'Ya~ introd~ced in evide~ce ~~ t:he p~·e-trial
hearmg, and does not have an exhibit number.)
The storage in the two reservoirs is made concul.·rently with Sevier Bridge receiving the first 89,280 acre
feet, the Piute Reservoir receiving the next 40,000 acre
feet. The next 32;000 acre feet are divided 75% to Sevier
Bridge, 25% to Piute; Sevi,er Bridge receives the next
i3,720 feet; the next 75,000 acre feet a~e divided 75%
then the decree
to Sevier Bridge and 25% to Piute,
provides : ''All otn-er or t1lrther ibafer available shall
be allocated
85% to Sevter Bridge Re~eriJoir and .15%
~~
~
~
~
.~--~- ~ ~:.;.
to the Piute Reservotr." (Cox Decree, Page 186)
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For the irrigation of th.e lands j_n Panguitch Valley,
the Cox Decree awarded a tota1 of l24.85 second feet
of primary water, 19.16 seco:nd feet of second cl~ss water
and 37.50 second feet of third class water, all with
periods "of use from March 15th .···to November 15th . of
each year. The Decree awarp.ed 44 secpnd ~eet of winter
water for use from :November 15th
M~rch 15th In
proportion to the primary rights (Cox Decree, Page ·9,
10 and 11).
.II

':'

•,::..

1

I

to

For use of the lands in Circle Valley, the Court
awarded 95.24 second feet of primary water, 32.50 second feet of secondary rights and 28.61 second feet of
third class rights with the period of use for all these
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rights from Aprillst to November 15th. The Cox Decree
also provides Circle Valley users with 30 second feet of
winter water with the ·period of use from November 15th
to Aprillst (Cox Decree, Pages 8, 9).
In a similar manner, the Cox Decree sets forth the
primary, direct flow rights of all the appellant canal
companies in Sevier~ Sanpete, Juab and Millard Counties. Each ·water right is defined in terms of qual·ity
(first, second or third class right, depending_ on the flow
of the river) quantity (amount that can· be diverted and
time (specified period of use).
Judge Jones in Finding No. 12 in the case now before this Court states:
·
-.~

"That during the months of July, August
and September the. plaintiffs and applicants have
not been able to satisfy their primary rights from
the flow of the river, and during July, August
and September, when irrigation is of the most
importance to applicants, the water available
approximates only a fraction of the primary
rights ; . . . " (Italics ours)
The fact of the matter is tha_t over the sixteen-year
period 1935 to 1950 inclusive, there was water available
to satisfy the primary rights in Panguitch Valley in full
for each month of the year for 10 years. Primary rights
were satisfied 95% for 3 years and 90% for 2 years for a
16-year average of 97.5%. For that period, the second
and third class rights were also satisfied for an average
of 45 days of each year. For this same period Circle
Valley primary rights have been satisfied on an average
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for

of s2.4%.
the irrigation season. Sevier Valley primary rights ( embr~cing appellants) have only received
57.5% of their _decreed _ water during this same span of
years. (River Corhniissiorlef's 1950 Report-Defs. Ex. 4,
Page 15). It c~n be seen by these figures that the Sevier
River is greatly over-appropriatedJ aJ!.d that every drop
of water has been beneficially used ahd reused. The pai·ties stipulated at the beginnihg of trial that many applications to appropriate water fi~ed since the Cox Decree
was entered have been r~jected by the State Engineer
without any hearing of any kind (R. 15). It is a well]plown fact that the river is· over-appropriated. (See
figure 20, page 155 of Def"s. Ex~ 54)
...

"".

,. ,. '-

~

- ' ...

"'

.

.!

~

'

.

.,

'

'l>

During the twenty-y¢ar period from Marchi; i916
to November 30, 1936, the State Engineer, with
than seven hundred parth~s to the action, their attorneys;
engineers, economists and adVl.sors, worked almost contirluously to brmg about a _decree which ~ould flrlally
adjudicate, determine ahd settle all rights to the use of
all of the Sevier River arid its tributaries. Th~ respondents and their predecessors wer~ participants in
this general adjudication whicH resulted in the box
Decree and the Decree was inade with full knowledge that
the tights granted therel.n would be limited by the geographic and climatic conditions which Prevail~d hi the
areas where the waters were to be used.

more.

~

.

Since the entry of the Cox Decree, several legal
actions have been instituted, but these have been chiefly
for an interpretation of the provisions of the Cox Decree.
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The present action is the first case which seeks to materially change the operation and distribution of substantial rights, as awarded Uf!Uler this Decree.
CHANGES PROPOSED IN
RESPONDENTS' APPLICATIONS
Since the entry- of the Cox Decree in 1936 the waters
of the Sevier River have been administered by two river
commissioners designated by the State Engineer, one
of the commissioners (Mr. Ogden) being located at
Richfield, Utah, and the other (Mr. Cole) at Delta, Utah.
These commissioners have through a system of automatic
measuring devices · (called clocks) installed at certain
gaging stations, kept accurate records of the flow of the
river and the quantities of water diverted from the river
into the canals. The Annual Reports of these measure-.
ments by the Sevier River Commissioners constitute
Defendants' Exhibits 4 and 13 to 17, inclusive.
Originally, there was a storage right for the Hatch
Town Reservoir. This right was acquired by the State
of Utah through the State Land Board. The State
also acquired 5000 acres of land to be irrigated under the
project. The Hatc4 Town Dam washed out in 1914. The
State abandoned the water right and no attempt was
made to re-build the dam. In 1949 ~orne of respondents
purchased the 5000 acres of land from the State, as
vvell as the land comprising the old Hatch Town Reservoir. Since the early 1860's, the respondents have taken
\Vaters from the direct flow of the Sevier River into their
canals and have used the sa1ne during the irrigation sea-
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son on their lands situated adjacent to the Sevier River.
For more than 75 years respondents have claimed no
storage rights. They now seek, under the guise of change
applications, to acquire a storage right for winter flo'v
waters for which they have heretofore, for more than
75 years had no need and have made but a·limited use,
permitting said winter waters for the most part to
flow down the natural channel of the Sevier River past
their last diversion point, (and until appropriated and
impounded by the Reservoir Companies) into the old
Sevier Lake where it was entirely wasted. The lands
of respondents are located in Panguitch and Circle
Valleys. The elevation of Panguitch is 6670 feet and at
Circleville 5624 feet. The winters are extremely severe
and at Panguitch it frequently freezes every month of
the year. (Defs. Ex. 7, 57, 58 and 59) The average date
of the last killing frost at Panguitch is June 21, and the
average date of the first killing frost in the fall is September 7. The average growing seas·on is only 78 days.
(Defs. Ex. 54, Page 65)
The applications are simply attempts on the part
of respondents, under the label of change applications, to
appropriate water for use on the 5000 acres of new lands
which they acquired from the State of Utah, and to appropriate by means of storage of winter waters an
additional supply for the irrigation of lands for which
they now have an adequate summer direct flow right.
We direct this Court's attention to appellants' exhibit No. 53, which exhibit includes photostatic copies of
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the water users; clain1s filed 1n
the ' general
adjudicat~oii
'
'
.
.
- t
.. '.
proceedings by all of the respondents. These claims were
made under oath and at a tinie when all of the respond'
ertts had no reason or interest ift making a claiiri for
water irt excess of their normal and beneficial use.
.

:

.

Paragraph 9, subdivision (L) on page 3 of each
water users claim requires an answer to this question:
Do yo'lf_ ~~e water for irrigation outside of the grawin!)
s~ason? Ten of the respondents stated: "n? use in nonirrigation season.'' Others used terms as follows: One
month in fall; early fall watering; very little some se~
sons;
fall plowing; March
1st to Nov. 15th; refe.r to
,,
Morse decree; stockwatering.
Paragraph 6, subdivision (b) oh page one of the
wftter users claifu requires art afiswer to this qliestioh:
''Annual period of use''' With one or two exceptions
the appellants limited their annual period of lise to
dates rtiiining from ahout March 15th to November 15th.
A few claim.ed a use from about March 1st Notember
30th.

to

The applications for permanent change of place of
use filed .by respondents with the State Engineer all
....... stated that the respondents had fully used their winter
water rights as decreed to them by the Cox Decree. The
state Enginee·r di'd not rule upon this avennent but
'
rejected the applications on the ground that they sought
an enlargement of present rights and would impair
vestetl tights if approved.
'

.

On appeal to the District Court, the appellants
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CQ}lte~de4 t~at $e responqe11ts had not ~~q~ fpl~ us~

of t~ei~ deere~~ ~nter w~t~r; t~at it h~~ p~~~ respon4~
~nts' :pract~~e to take ~u~~ ~es~ t~~P the 74 cubi~ ~ecoJld
~eet of 'vinter 'v~ter aw~rdeq ~~ tne Cox Decree i:p.~o
th~ir c~n~ls, and 9ut ~f th~ ~mq~~ts that ll~4 been
diy~~ted m~ch had "!leen retqrne<f ·directly to the river
thr~~~~ ~h~ 'f~ste\yays. ~ppe1la:.~t~' exh~Plt~ n~mb.er~d
19 to 31 inclusive a!e gr~p:P.s show~ng the 'rint~r · wate:r
diverted by respondents from 1945 to 1951 into respondept~ various ca~als as compared to the amounts of
wate! avai~~ble. ~~ppellants' exhibit 32 is a summary
of t#~ n~n~-use i!l Pa~guitch V ~lley and Circle Valley by
~ll of resp9:ndent ~p~l cpmpa~i~s. These figures are
pas~d on the me~~urement~ perspnally made by Leland
C. O~ll~ste~ f9r t:P.~ ye~r~ indicated. Mr. Callister differeq by l.~l% ~s compared tp th~ data compiled by the
Riye:r Co!llillissiq~e:r. (~. ()15) r.fllis sulllmary (defend~:pt~' e~hipit ~2) s4ow~ that i:p. rn~:Q.Y winter months the
:r~~ponqept c~na.l companies qiy~rted no water whatsoever for winter use. The overall effect of these compil~t~o11s show th~t the respq~d~:pts h~d seldom used
~s rq~ch as OJle-third qf tl,leir cl~imed winte:r water rights.
However, nu~e:rous ind~viq:qal respa,ndent~ testified that
~ey ha4 m;;tde fu~l ~se of their winter water, that the
measurem~~t~ takf3n }>y th~ Riv~r Commissioner and by
Mr. Cal!ister were inacc~rate, and t~at there had been
no forfeit~re of winter wate:r or RJ!.Y portion thereof.
•

. .>

~

,·

~
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•

•

•

•

•

•

·:

/

.1\~tho~gh tn~ t~i~l cour~ ~tateq

time and time agai~
th~t it would not and coulq not q~term~:qe any iss11e of
forfeitur~
o:r :non-"Q~er ill tne~e
pro~~ngs,
it did in fact•
f ·
·
.
'·
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make a specific finding on this point (Finding No. 11).
The court lacked jurisdiction .to make such a finding but
for purpose of argument this highly disputed matter
may be taken in accordance with the respondents' evidence-that is to say that during the winter months when
the ground was frozen the respondents have diverted
their entire decreed winter water right into their canals
and used the same upon their lands.
The Climatological Data compiled by the U. 8.
Department of Commerce shows that in the Pa~guitch
area for January, 1949 the average maximum temperature vvas 28°, the average minimum was 2 degrees below
zero. In February the average maximum was 34°, the
average minimum was -1 o. · The diversion of waters in
the wintertime into the respondents canals would result
in those canals freezing solid and the waters which
flowed upon the land would result in the formation of
sheets of ice and the direct return of the water to the
river. As a result, the waters 6f the Sevier River which
have been applied to lands in Panguitch and Circle
Valleys have, of necessity, quickly flowed back to the
river and thence into the Piute Reservoir where they
have been stored in accordance with the Cox Decree and
used by the parties having storage rights therein.
A great number of exhibits were introduced to
illustrate much technical data bearing upon the question
of whether appellants' vested rights would be impaired
if the applications were approved. While many of these
exhibits do not require detailed study by this court

'
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plaintiff's exhibit G is immediateiy hereafter reproduced
in full as the facts shown by such exhibit will be referred
to several times in this brief. The exhibit shows the average flow of the river past the Hatch and Kingston
Gaging Stations for each month of the ten-year period
1940 to 1949, inclusive. The measurements at these stations show that during the winter months (October, November, December, January, February, March and
April) the flow of the river at Kingston greatly exceeds
the flow at Hatch, and during the months of May the
flow at Hatch generally exceeds the flow at Kingston.
During the months of June, July, August and Septem·ber, the flow at Hatch always greatly exceeds the flow
at Kingston. The diminished flow at Kingston coincides with the period of heavy irrigation in the Panguitch
and Circleville areas and the period of increased flow at
Kingston coincides with the period of decreased irrigation in the Circleville and Panguitch areas. Besides reflecting the large amount of water that is consumed in
irrigating respondents' lands, the figures illustrate the
great variation in the flow of the river !rom month to
month and from year_ to year. Nature does not furnish
a steady supply of water and thus the amount received
to fulfill the many users' rights varies constantly.

EXHIBIT ''G''
(This exhibit shows the flow at the Hatch and
Kingston Gaging Stations in cubic second feet for the
month and years indicated as follows:)
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MONTHLY MEAN SECOND
FEE~'
t1'
.;~

-~

~ ~4q__________
60. '{
1941.......... 48.1
1942.......... 91.1
1943.......... 70.8
i944.......... 64.~

!~~5----~-----

§2~~

Kingston

130
1

- ; , ..._

123

i95
159

t3s

149

1946.......... 54.1
1947 -~----~--- 51.7
1948.......... ;~4.0
1949.......... 50.9

i22

M~an: ~-----~; ~ &l.{~

138.~

'9'6.&

139

s·5.2

Batch

P.~~!

52.8
8'1.0
72.1

JPng~t9,.n

1,~4() .......... ~~ 7.9,

64.1~

150.4

~P~~
57.7

60.9.
€)4.8

7~.9

~ftcb

193 '

1947·r-·-····-- 136.0
1~4~---------}51.p_•
.J. .
1\;re~n : ...... 143.5
+ ·. \ ("'\
,,

I

llatch

19~0.......... ..5'7 .5'
1941 .......... 214.0
1942---------- 152.0

:{{ingsto~

78.3
69.4
56.5'

148.0
111.0
57.8
102.0

25.5
28.8

1~48..........

77.~

8.S
17.0
13.1
74.4
34.5

i18

72.6~

173.0

IP~~

King~~

~a~ch

444

84.7
285.0

274
414
377.1

154.0
?90.0
282.7

64.2
217.0
146.0
401.0

?90
420

364
i6~

:Qatch

137.0
ll1.Q

1944.... ~--~-1945..........
1946..........
1947..........

166
159
178

21Q~O

116.0
~3.1

l~~

68.8

64.8

8.69.9

48.8

10.3

i84

121.0
425.0

8.8

t

i943.......... .78.3

1949.......... 151.0
Mean: ______ 114.9

8l.O

JUNE
5~.5

~-·l-

A-U. GUST

JULY

269
189

l43.q
-375~0
196.0

494

19~8---------- 128.0

128

i27

11.7
481.0

473.0

l94~------···- l~~-0

66.2
61.1
96.9
83.9

1~-6

227.Q
212.0
169.(}
17.7.()
140.0
274.0
364.0
227.1

1945.......... l04.Q

Kingston

582.0

~8~-9

i944.. ________ iio.o

Batch

775.0
&21.0

1943.......... 181.0

1942-----------

189

50.2

t7.8

719

98.2

!il

148

170
143
t~~
149
158
162
94

161.0

1941..........

Kingston

MAY

APRIL
~atch

?1~RCli

FEBRUARY

JANUaRY
.·
'c
. - .. Hauh

-~

'82.8

93:1
114.0
61.4
92.8
)

~5.p

97.6
90.4

¥i:ngs~

. 6.3
97.5
!5~.q
68.8
10.4
64.4
19.8
65.3
21.6

?5.2
43.2

,. a~~s

288.0
97.4

~28.0
'1.

'

9,.2

'

123.0
29~0

347.0
164.5

2~3.0

SE~TE.MBER
~atch

Ki~gston

~82.4

115.0
92.3
65.5
84.8
88.7
50.0
75.4
56.2
87.6
79.7
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18.2
64.9
13.2
38.2
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( CONTI~U:ED)

OCTOBER
1939__________

·Batch

Kingston

78.6.

1940__________ 6P.2

i94i__________ 122.6

1942__________ 1 92.8
1943 __________ 7~.6
i 944..... ----- 82.7
1945__________ 84.7
l946 __________ 73.0
i947·----~--- 69.8
i948 __________ 5~.3
Mean : ______ 79.87
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DECEMBE!l.

~oy~~~~~
Hatch

14Q.O.
127.0
199.0
119.0
108.0
~
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66.7
54.5
106.0
·st.3
67.3
82.9
'11.0

;
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i44.9

£
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"

•
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129
125
195
168
146
i39
142
13.9,
. '·
144
103
143:0
,1,'

97.9
76.1
()9.3
65.3
58.3
58.9
70.4
54.8
66.2

140

152
150
152
150
119
147.7

•

Kingston

62.6
48.4.

167

67.7
61.3
73.24

....

Hatch

123
198

~.~-7

113.P
90.6
46.7
119.6

~.'

\

Kingston

Twenty of the respondents seek by their applications
to build a new reservoir on the same site where the old
~~t~h {pwn ~~~ w~shed out in 1914. They propose to
store what they claim as direct flow rights in the~ winter
and ~arly spr~ng ~~asons and use
th~se w.at~rs in the
..
summer irrigation season. Thes~ t'Y~~t~ appl~c~tio~s
state on their faces that the op~:r$ltiou W.ill be car.ried
on as follows:
'

,;;

'

'-·

·,

••

'

~

'•

.

4

~.

,'

•

'

'

"Water will be stored when not needed, and
when needed the water will be :run tb:rq11gb ·tb.~
reservoir. T·his is in order to improve the use of
the wat~I?, conserving it when 'YI:?t n.:e,~detJ: fg!
use in 1!19~~ critical ~~~sons of the ye~r." (E~phasis added, Plaintiff's Ex. A)
·. ·
These respondents are very frank in this statement
in their applic~~i9~s. N am~~y, t~a~ t~e~ ~ee~ to sto~~
water for which they have had no _need. This presents
the ~hief point of controversy in these cases. Respondents now seek to store the water for which tlley have had
'

~

~

~

•

.....
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no need, and particularly the winter water which they
have not heretofore used in any substantial amount and
for which they largely made no claim of use and which
has, for more than 80 years last past, been permitted
to flow down the natural channel of the Sevier River
unrestricted, and which has been appropriated by and
used to make up the water rights of the appellants;
particula'rly the storage rights of the owners of the
Piute Reservoir and the Sevier Bridge Reservoir. The
twenty cases which fall within this category are as follows : ( Pls. Ex. A)

PANGUITCH VALLEY
PLAINTIFF

Case No.

Application
No.

Acreage Presently Irrigated

East Panguitch
Irrigation Company __________

1472

a-2329

1260.2

Alvin D. Wilson, Lindeau
Foremaster and Mrs. Leah
Wilson, Administratrix
of the estate of Eli D.
Wilson, Deceased ----------------

1473

a-2394

276

Angus A. Barton &
Osborne Henrie ----------------.-M. V. Hatch __________________________

1474

a-2334

113

1481

a-2396

444.2

James L. Hatch ____________________

1482

a-2395

222.1

Rex Whittaker --------------------

1483

a-2382

146.9

Bear Creek Irrigation
Company ------------------------------

1484

a-2381

293.5

John M. Perkins,
Marshall Ditch ------------------

1486

a-2376

425.1

East Bench Irrigation
Company ------------------··----------

1487

a-2328

750.6
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Application

PLAINTIFF

Case No.

No.

Acreage Presentl:r Irrigated

Long Canal Company __________

1490

a-2333

1709.9

McEwen Ditch Company ____

1491

a-2332

950.1

Mayo Riggs ------------------------

1492

a-2331

45.0

Barton,· LeFevre, Tebbs
Ditch Company, Inc. __________

1493

a-2330

419.3

Total Acres________________
Hatch Town Irrigation Company --------------------

1480

a-2407

6852.39

1012.9

(Located above the Hatch measuring station, the water is
diverted directly from Mammoth Creek).
John A. Yardley______________________

1485

a-2378

500.0

(Located above the Hatch measuring station, the water is
diverted directly out of Mammoth and Assay Creeks).
Total Acres________________

1512.9

CIRCLE VALLEY
Thompson Ditch ----------------

1475

a-2379

505.0

Circleville Irrigation
Company -------------------- __________

1476

a~2377

4225.4

Parker Brothers, M.
Park and Eli Parker----------

1477

a-2374

74.4

Loss (Lost) Creek
Irrigation Company ----------

1478

a-2·375

858.4

Junction Middle
Ditch Company ------------------

1479

a-2408

372.3

Total Acres________________

6034.15

Three of the respondents have filed applications
in 'vhich they seek to use their present direct flow rights
in the irrigation season for the irrigating of 5,000 acres
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~·

of entirely new land~ which is situated under the old
al1andoned State dan~l. They state in their appli~_atio~s
that the purpose of the change is as follows :
'

'

!'

''Applicant intends to ir~igate said lands
under this appli~tion, (5,ooq ft,~r~~ 9f ~~W l~~qs)
together w.ith others to be made. her~after, for the
purpose of producing pasture feeds and other
crops, and applicant desires the right to change
water at various times througho1:1t the -ye~r t~
use in this manner as applicant deems advisable.''
1
· \f'
-r· ..
'' ·
{Pis. Ex~· ::B;· a-2371 f H · .These applicants seek to use the water for the irrigation of 5,000 acres of additional lands not heretofore
irrigat~~ l>Y a~y Qf ~h~ :re~:p.9~dent~.

They have al~9
filed applications, as her~inabove shown, to store the
.
·: t·
'
•'
winter and early spring flow, which they do not need and
which they have heretofore made no claim to the right
to use, for irrigation purposes. Thus, they would use
the,it; present S'IJ!Pply_ for th~ irrigation of the 5 ,OOf!. a.cr~f
o,f new land and use the stored water fPr f~~ irrigatio~t
of their present lands. This would allow these three

respondents
to ~ouble their s~pply of water,
and if the
. .
.
'
applications are approved, would in effect permit th~~~
re&P.P.I!dents, under a guise of change application, to
a:p.:pro~riate suffi~ient water to irrigate 5,000 acres of
additional land.
The applications
that fall
within this
.
,
.
class are as follows:
-;....

.

.

.'

'

.

"'f".

~

•
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~

:r.rotosed

O•t•"**i·

ltater

~

caaeN~

.
ColUmn

AitjU~
tion

No.

-·

_,

J

c&aiijiL

nation and
PlaiR tiffs'
Eihibit A

Application.

cOlumn

Colunm

P~:\!nt~•·

EX ibit B
.

A

B

~l..

·,

c

~:·<l·

East Bench Irrigation Company ___ _ 1471

a-2372

Long Canal
Company --------------

1488

a-2373

2163.88

1709.9

2200

;,

1489

a·-23.7i

1190

126o.2

1900

3720.7

5100

~

750.6

700
. .. l ...

..~ ..L

~

1000

...,.

East Panguitch
Irrigation
Company --------------

T'otal Acres·-------------~-

;

,~,'.,...(

The plaintiffs' claims of acreage are iliconsistent
and un~_eli~bl~ as ~:h_own by;. tlie following itemization
o(. ~heir ;_claims'! _ColQ.Inn ~ A represe,Iits the a·creage
cla~med py 1 eac4 . of__ th~. foregoing plaintiffs in their
water users' claim filed before .the Proposed D~termi
nation was formulated in _1926 (Defend~nt~'. E~hibi.t
5g). Coluinrl B represents the acreage listed. in the
Proposed Determination compiled by George M. Bacon;
the then State ~1lg!neer, ,a:fter ~.akip.g -~ sur;vey; of the
piaintiffs' irrigated Hinds t:Peferidants' E~ibit 5~,
Pages 15 and 16). Column C repres~nts the acreage
n_ow claimed to be under irrigation by the plaintiffs in
their change app~ications (Plaintiffs' Exhibit B). The
court w~l note th~~·} in th~ir change (applications as
set forth
plafutiffs' Exhibit A (applications NOS.
2~28, 2.333, aP.:!-1 .2329) . the three above-listed companies
have stated their irrigated acreage to be the s~me as
that shown in Bacon's Proposed Detenhination (Column
B abo"Ve) w-hich figures are consideriibly lower than
the acreage lis.ted in the change applica tiohs seeking
to irrigate 5;000 additional acres of land (Column C
above).

in
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It is the position of the respondents that the Cox
Decree awarded to them fixed quantities of water not
limited by time or place of use or manner of use and
as their counsel stated "such water may be taken in a
bucket and dumped into the Colorado River'' if respondents so decided.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Following are set forth the points upon which the
appellants rely for a reversal of the decree entered by
the trial court :
1. The trial court erred in finding in paragraph 6
of the Findings,
''That ~he plaintiffs (applicants) are entitled,
respectively, to the use of water of the Sevier
River in the amounts and for the periods as set
forth in the 'Cox Decree' of 1936. ''
in that the evidence is insufficient to support such finding, and such finding is contrary to the evidence.
This is assigned as error for the further reason
that the trial court ought not determine the rights of
the parties as of now, but should have limited this
finding to the fact that the plaintiffs were awarded certain rights by and as set forth in the Cox Decree.
2. The trial court erred in finding in paragraph
7 of the Findings,
"That the applicants and plaintiffs herein
at the present time divert all of the waters
which they were decreed from the Sevier River
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and its tributaries by means of diversion dams
located in the natural stream beds.''
in that the evidence is insufficient to support such findings and such finding is contrary to the evidence.
3. The trial court erred in finding in paragraph
16 of the Findings,
''That the construction of the reservoir near
Hatch, as proposed by applicants, is. physically
and economically feasible, and that applicants
have. the financial ability to complete the proposed works.''
in that the evidence is insufficient to support such findIngs.
4. The trial court erred in making its findings No.
17, in that the matters therein set forth are not properly issues in this cause.
5. The trial court erred In finding in paragraph
19 of the Findings that the State Engineer and the
Water Commissioners should not be charged with the
responsibility of seeing to it that these appellants get
their full water rights but that such duty be charged
to the plaintiffs.
6. The trial court erred in making its finding No.
20 in that the evidence is insufficient to support such
finding.
7. The trial court erred in making its finding No.
21 in that the evidence is insufficient to support such
finding.
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8.

The triiil court erred
23 of the Findings,

ill

!liiding

in

paragraph

system, on conditions, ts
fea.~ibl~ i~. th.e present. ~ase. ''
in that flie evidence is insufficieh t to support such
finding and that such finding is contrary to the evidence.
"That

the 'on call;

The trial cotirt erred in ii6t making any findings
concerning the returii flo_w ' of w~ter used on the proposed new -til~rea.ge of 5,ooo actes to tie brought under
cultivation, and particularly in not finding tlHit in irrigating such new acreage th~re would be far less return
flow for the benefit of these appellants than the use
of water on the a~reage irrigated at the time of and
. .
. -.
..
t.
since the entry of the Cox Decr~e.

9.

10. The court erred in making its Conclusions of
Law in determining· that the applications in question
ought to be conditionally approved, aiid in ordering the
State Engineer to approve such applications (Coiichisions of Law NOS. 1; 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9).
11. The court erred in making its Conclusions of
Law No. 6 in concluding (a) that the present subsisting
water rights of all the pa!ties are set forth in the
"Cox'' decree, and (b) that no party has lost or forfeited his or its water by abandonment or nonuser.
This conclusion is assigned as error for the reason
that the court in the instant proceedings should not
determine the present rights of the parties, and should
not determine the issue of abandonment or non-user.
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12. That the court erred in making its Conclusion
of La"v No. 7 in approving each of the applications on
the conditions therein set forth.
This conclusion is assigned as error for the reason that there is no evidence in the record to justify
the trial court in imposing the co~ditions therein set
forth or in determining that such conditions will protect the vested water rights of these appellants.
13. That the court ered in not making its Conclusion of Law to the effect that the approval of the
applications would impair the vested rights of these
appellants.
14. That the trial court erred in rendering its judgment and decree in favor of the plaintiffs and respondents in that:
a. It re-writes and re-determines portions of the
Cox Decree wherein the water rights of these appellants are specifically determined and adjudicated.
b. By the readjudication of the rights of these
appellants, such rights are restricted, lessened, and
impaired, and accrue to the appellants in a_ manner
different from that originally awarded as to time and
amount of return flow, time when and amount of water
that is available for storage and apportionment as
among themselves of water received from time to time
for storage.
c. It permits respondents to enlarge upon their
previously adjudicated rights by extending the use
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thereof for the irrigation of an additional five thousand
acres of land, and at a place where there will be a
lesser return flow for the benefit of appellants.
d. It permits respondents to enlarge upon their
previously adjudicated rights by using their winter
rights which could only be used in a limited way and to a
limited degree, at a different time of the year when
the use of such water will impair the vested rights of
these appellants.
e. It permits respondents to use the water during
summer months when the return flow for appellants'
benefit will be less than as used when the Cox Decree
awarded the respondents and appellants their respective rights.
f. It permits respondents to use the water during
the summer months when the time of return flow for
storage is changed so that the respective storage rights
of various appellants will be changed, and so that
water which now goes to storage will be used by primary users as a direct flow right.
g. It permits respondents to convert a direct flow
winter use and right to a storage right for summer
use, which results in an impairment of the vested rights
of appellants.
h. It requires and permits the respondents to enforce conditions of river administration in the deliverv•'
of water covering the appellants' rights, which under
the law is made the duty of the State Engineer and
his River Commissioners.
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i. It sets out an arbitrary formula for determining whether appellants will receive the water to which
they are entitled, and which formula provides for arbitrary computations as to volumes and periods of time.
j. It fails to provide that the change applications
shall not impair the vested rights of the appellants and
does not provide that the approvals are conditioned and
made subject to the vested rights of the appellants.

k. It will result in an impairment of the vested
rights of these appellants.

I. Paragraph 6 of the decree gives to the Water
Commissioners the right to change the conditions therein
set forth, without any limitations and solely within the
discretion of said Water Commissioners without regard
to the rights of lower users.
m. The decree is contrary to the findings and is
not supported by the findings.
n. The decree is contrary to law.
15. The trial court erred in failing to find the issues
in favor of appellants, and in failing to determine that
the decision of the State Engineer in disapproving the
applications should be sustained.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECREE UNLAWFULLY TAKES
WATER FROM APPELLANTS AND GIVES THAT WATER
TO RESPONDENTS FOR USE AND CONSUMPTION UPON
5,000 ACRES OF RAW SAGEBRUSH LANDS RECENTLY
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ACQUIRED BY_THE RESPONDENTS AND LOCATED FAR
FROM THE SEVIER RIVER.
POINT 2
THE DECREE UNLAWFULLY PERMITS RESPONDENTS TO CONVERT DIRECT FLOW RIGHTS INTO S~OR
AGE RIGHTS.
POINT 3
THE DECREE IMPAIRS VESTED RIGHTS AS SHOWN
BY:
(A) DEFINITION AND DETERMINATION OF THE
VESTED RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS.
(B) DEFINITION
AND DETERMINATION OF THE
VESTED RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS
.
•

(c) THE DECREE APPROVING THE APPLICATIONS
ENLARGES THE VESTED RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS AT
THE EXPENSE AND IMPAIRMENT OF APPELLANTS'
VESTED RIGHTS.

POINT 4
THE DECREE TAKES FROM THE STATE ENGINEER
AND THE RIVER COMMISSIONERS THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE RIVER ABOVE THE KINGSTON GAGING
STATION AND UNLAWFULLY VESTS SUCH ADMINISTRATION IN THE RESPONDENTS.
POINT 5
(A) THE DECREE IN EFFECT ABROGATES THE COX
DECREE NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT WERE MERELY TO REVIEW
THE STATE ENGINEER'S REJECTION OF RESPONDENTS'
APPLICATIONS.
(B) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDIC-

TION TO MAKE ANY INTERPRETATION, CONSTRUCTION
OR MODIFICATION OF THE COX DECREE AND THE
COURT'S ACTION IN THIS RESPECT WAS UNLAWFUL
AND VOID. UNDER THE GUISE OF REVIEWING THE
ACTION OF THE STATE ENGINEER THE TRIAL COURT
UNLAWFULLY ADJUDICATED WATER RIGHTS.
POINT 6
THE DECREE IS ARBITRARY AND UNCONSCION-
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ABLE AND THE FORMULA ADOPTED BY THE TRIAL
COURT IS WITHOUT SUPPORT IN THE EVIDENCE. THE
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DECREE ARE UNINTELLIGIBLE AND CONFLICTING
AND IMPOSSIBLE OF PROPER CONSTRUCTION AND
DETERMINATION.
POINT 7
THE DECREE IS ERRONEOUS IN THAT IT IS ADMINISTRATIVELY UNWORKABLE.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECREE UNLAWFULLY TAKES
WATER FROM APPELLANTS AND GIVES THAT WATER
TO RESPONDENTS FOR USE AND CONSUMPTION UPON
5,000 ACRES OF RAW SAGEBRUSH LANDS RECENTLY
ACQUIRED BY THE RESPONDENTS AND LOCATED FAR·
FROM THE SEVIER RIVER.

As noted above, there are three applications which
have been separately approved in paragraph 2 of the
trial court's judgment and decree, which propose to
apply the waters to be stored in the IIatch Town Reservoir to 5,000 acres of raw sagebrush land. The applications are (plaintiffs' Exhibit B):
Present Acreage Irrigated

NAME OF APPLICANT

Application No.

East Panguitch Irrigation Co.________

a-2371

1260.20 acres

East Bench Irrigation Co_______________
Long Canal Co .. _________________________________

a-2372
a-2373

750.6 acres
1709.9 acres

TotaL_______________

·3720. 7 acres

The newly acquired lands are to be irrigated in
addition to the 3720.7 acres which these companies presently irrigate. This fantastic scheme would increase the
irrigated acreage of these companies by 134%. In re-
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gard to the new 5,000 acres their applications as approved by the trial court would permit them ''to make

exchwnge, at any time, of water owned by applicant as
applicant shaU deem advisable." The irrigated acreage of respondents in the entire Panguitch and Circle
Valleys is only approximately 14,000 acres, and now
after more than 75 years of settlement and farming
in the Sevier River Valley, these applicants blandly
assert the right to cultivate this huge amount of additional land. This singular fact is sufficient to sustain
the State Engineer's rejection of these applications
and justify a reversal of the trial court's decree. On
the basis of 10 acres to one Salt Lake City Block, the
new lands of respondents would embrace an area comparable to 500 city blocks, that is from the Hotel Utah
to 22nd South, thence East to 22nd East, thence
North to South Temple extended and thence West to
point of beginning. This court should judicially acknowledge the fact that it is an impossible feat to somehow-squeeze enough water out of a right which has served
3720.7 acres to take care of 8720 acres without impairment of vested rights of lower appropriators in the overappropriated Sevier River system. As stated in En-

larged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood
Ditch Co. (Colo.), 183 P. 2d 552, 555:
''In fact, the acreage under irrigation is the
principal basis of measurement of the use of
water in the adjudication of priorities and use

on increased acreage of necessity is 'evidence
although rebuttable, of increased use either i~
volume or time." (Italics added)
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These 5000 acres are marked by the red crosses on
plaintiffs' Exhibit T. They 1ie in 19 sections in 3 townships along the east side of Panguitch Valley. As
shown by plaintiffs' Exhibit T or more accurately by
defendants' Exhibit 18 the new lands are from 2 to
3 miles away from the river while the lands presently
being irrigated by respondents lie within 1f2 mile of
the river. Thus, waters being used under present conditions :r;nust move a distance of approximately y2 mile
to return to the river whereas the bulk of the waters
applied to the new lands would have to seep from
2 to 3 miles in order to return to the river and be reused by lower appropriators. (R. 216)
More alarming is the fact that the distinguished
expert for the plaintiff, (Dr. 0. W. Israelson), and the
distinguished expert for the defendant, (B. F. Lofgren), agreed that the consumptive use of water on the
new land, based on the average type of crop raised in
Panguitch Valley would amount to 21 inches (Lofgren,
R. 367, 417) or 22 inches of water (Israelson, Ex. W
Chart 4). The use on the 5000 acres of 21 inches of
water per acre would be equivalent to 9000 acre feet
of water totally consumed. (R. 370) The net result
would be that of the 13,000 acre feet which is proposed
to be stored in the Hatch Town Reservoir, 1,000 acre
feet would be lost through evaporation while the water
was in storage (R. 369), 3,000 acre feet would be lost
in transit through the 4 miles of canal, and 9000 acre
feet would be applied and completely consumed on the
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new land. Of the 3000 acre feet lost in the gravelly
bed of the canal, but a fraction would seep to the strea1n
bed and thus the only return flow to the river out of
13,000 acre feet impounded at Hatch would be 800 or
900 acre feet. (R. 370)
Furthermore, there are a number of springs on
the long slope on the east side of Panguitch Valley
where the new 5000 acres of land are located (R. 371).
These springs bear out the fact that a portion of the
substrata underlying the 5000 acres are somewhat impervious and are sloping away from the river. Other
beds slope toward the river at a less degree than the
surface. The water on its downward course of percolation would strike these underlying beds and thereby
be forced to the surface. Around the springs there are
clumps of willows and grass which form good pasturage but prevents return flow to the river (R. 372).
These spring waters have already been appropriated
and any increased flow that might result from the
waters applied to the new 5000 acres would inure to
the benefit of these appropriators. The ultimate return
flow to the river would be decreased further by this
double use.
The experts of both parties concurred in the
amount of consumptive use. The distant location of
the new lands from the river ·Can plainly be seen on
the respective exhibits (plaintiffs' Exhibit T; defendants' Exhibit 18). The trial court did not make any
findings on this vital testimony, but ignored it, when
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the only possible conclusion to be drawn therefrom is
that if respondents irrigate this vast tract of additional
land, there 'vould be practically no return flow. As
the river system is now operated in an average year
60% of the water applied to respondents' lands during
the sunnner season returns to the river (R. 395).
One of appellants' principal contentions on appeal
is that this use of water on 5000 acres of new land, far
removed from the river, clearly impairs their vested
rights~ No extensive citation of_ case authorities is necessary on this point, for the law is stated in the governing statute as follows:
73-3-3 U. C. A. 1953
''Any person entitled to the use of water may
G.hange the place of diversion or use and may use
the water for other purposes than those for which
it was originally appropriated but no such change
shall be made if it imp,airs any vested' right without just compensation.'' (Emphasis added)
POINT 2
THE DECREE UNLAWFULLY PERMITS RESPONDENTS TO CONVERT DIRECT FLOW RIGHTS INTO STORAGE RIGHTS.

In addition to the three applications to apply water
to 5000 acres of new land, this case includes 20 other
applications which seek to store winter and summer
direct flow rights for subsequent use in June, July and
August on the lands being presently irrigated.
Appellants admit that respondents would be benefitte·d if they were a!ble to store winter water which they
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do not now use or consume for use during the growing
season and particularly use it on 5000 acres of new
land. Such an acquisition of additional water for summer use would be as beneficial as money in the bank.
(See Finding No. 19) But the test is whether this can
be done without taking the water of lower users. The
evidence in this record conclusively indicates that it
cannot be done.
The total winter flow rights of all the Panguitch
users equals 44 second feet for the period November
15th to March 15th as determined by the Cox Decree.
In Circle Valley the total winter flow rights from November 15th to April 1st equals 30 second feet. (R. 46)
These amounts are direct flow rights. That is, when
used they have always been diverted from the river
directly into the canals and applied to the lands without
being contained in. any reservoir or stored in any manner. Such use has returned the water to the river for
storage in the Piute Reservoir.
The defendants' Exhibits numbers 38, 42 and 46
are a group of photographs which show the amount of
snow and the climatic conditions which prevail in the
Panguitch area during these winter months. Exhibits
numbered 57 and 58 are Climatalogical Data for January and February for the year 1949, compiled by the
U.S. Department of Commerce. The exhibits show that
in January the max'imwn temperature for Panguitch was 39° and the minimum was -24°. The average maximum for the month was 28°, the average mini-
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mum was -2°. In February the maximum was 49°,
the minimun1 -27°, the average maximum was 34°, the
average minitnum was -1 o. In short, it was cold and
the ground was frozen. Assuming for the sake of argument that respondents have in the past applied the
entire 74 second feet of decreed winter water to their
lands during the period November 15, to March 15,
this water of ~ecessity would have flowed quickly over
the frozen ground and returned to the river. The amount
of evaporation would be very slight and the consumptive use or transpiration would equal zero. Practically
the entire flow would return to the river and hence to
the Piute Reservoir whe.re it would be stored to fill the
storage rights- of appellant storage CO'·mpanies. Water
which flows into Piute. Reservoir in the summer months
normally does not flow in sufficient quantity to belong
to the storage companies but goes to the primary direct
flow users.
The historical background as to how, when and
why the storage companies acquired their rights is very
important to an understanding of appellants' present
contentions. By 1900, after more than 40 years of settlement along the Sevier River, practically all of the
lands that could be placed under cultivation by direct
diversion from the river had been so accomplished.
Notwithstanding these direct diversions there were still
large quantities of water flowing into Sevier Lake where
they were wasted. This fact prompted the formation
of the reservoir companies and the building of the Piute
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and Sevier Bridge Reservoirs. These reservoirs were
built for the specific purpose of catching the unused
winter flow and high spring runoff of the Sevier River.
The reservoir companies took this water which no other
user along the river could or would use and thousands
of acres of fine agricultural lands in Sevier, Sanpete
and Millard Counties were made productive. The companies having storage rights in the Piute and Sevier
Bridge Reservoirs acquire practically all of their water
during the winter and early spring months. Water
which passes the Kingston Gaging Station and reaches
the Piute Reservoir during the summer irrigation season does not normally fulfill storage rights, but is
permitted to flow on down the river where it is diverted
by the various canal companies having direct flow summer riy.its. Some of these primary users are the appe]r
lants, E ichfield Irrigation & Canal Co. ; Annabella Irrigation t ;o.; Elsinore Canal Co.; Brooklyn Canal Co.;
Monroe Irrigation Co.; Wells Irrigation Co.; Joseph
Irrigati\ 1n Company; Sevier -Valley Canal Co.; Vermillion lrrigation Co. and Monroe South Bend Canal Co.
Because the Cox Decree apportions storage rights between Piute and Sevier Bridge Reservoirs, the water
rights of the five co_mpanies which own the Sevier Bridge
would be prejudiced in the same manner as the Piute
Reservoir and Irrigation Co. They are: Deseret Irrigation Co.; Melville Irrigation Co.; Delta Canal Company; (jentral Utah Water Co. and Abraham Irrigation Co. Sevier Bridge and Piute Reservoirs are filled
concuriently under the Cox Decree in the amounts as
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stated at page 11 of this brief and if during their
storagt! season, the 'vater is not permitted to flow into
Piute ]leservoir in the amounts and at the same time as
has

be•~n

the case under the Cox Decree, then appellants'

storage rights will be diminished. From Panguitch to
the Piute Reservoir is approximately 42 miles. From
the last canal diversion of respondents in Circl~ Valley
to the Piute Reservoir is approximately l:Y2 miles.
Under present conditions the return flow from the
application ofwinter water 'vould be almost immediate
or within two or three days at the most. But the return
flow from the newly proposed stored water will be
delayed during the period of time that the water is
stored at Hatch. Thus 'vinter water impounded in the
Hatch Town Reservoir for use during the following
summer vvould be taken directly from the appellants ns
an absolute certainty.
The judgment and decree entered by the trial court
approving the respondents' scheme to hold back and
store winter water, (which they do not now use Dl
consume) and which they may then release during the
irrigation season for use on 5000 acres of additional
new land and/or for use on the presently irrigated lands
cannot possibly operate without impairing the vested
rights of these appellants. The storage companies are
deprived of their water as surely as if the trial court
ordered forthright that they give up and convey the
waters to the respondents with the return flow inuring
to the benefit of the primary users.
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POINT 3
THE DECREE IMP AIRS VESTED RIGHTS AS SHOWN
BY:
(A) DEFINITION AND DETERMINATION OF THE
VESTED RIGHTS O'F RESPONDENTS.

The fundamental inquiry in litigation involving a
request to change the point of diversion and place and
nature of use of irrigation waters so as not to impair
vested rights is : Precisely what are the rights of both
the applicant for the change and the protestants thereto?
In the instant case the Cox Decree specifies a maximum amount of water which respondents are entitled
to divert from the river into their canals and to apply
onto their lands. Respondents testified that they diverted
their decreed winter water into their canals and let it
flow over their pastures in all seasons of the year, particularly November, December, January, February,
March and April. During these winter months, the
ground is frozen and the return flow of the waters to
the river is practically complete.

The right to use the waters at such time, in such
man;ner and for such purpose is the limit and extent of
resp-ondents' winter rights.
For respondents' rights are defined in law as follows: 73-1-3, U. C. A. 1953
''Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the use of water
in this state. (Emphasis added).
This statutory provision is siruilarly expressed in the
Cox Decree:
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"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that beneficial use
shall be the basis, the measure and the limitation
of all rights to the use of the waters of said
Sevier River System herein determined.'' (Page
2 of the Decree)
"
.. the rights herein decreed are subject to
the condition that they are required and necessary for beneficial uses, and such rights are subject to the limitations and conditions that the
same are used for beneficial purposes, economically and without waste. Any water diverted from
the said river and/ or its tributaries, not beneficially used under the rights of the respective parties to this decree shall be returned to the river
by the most practical and direct route.'' (Page
231)
In Gunnison Irrig,ation Co. vs. Gu;nnison H. C. Co.,
52 Utah 347, 174 Pac. 852, the Supreme Court of Utah
stated:
''In short, the rights of a prior appropriator
are measured and limited by the extent of his
appropriation and app}ication to a beneficial
use.''
And in referring to this same statutory provision, this
court stated in Salt Lake City vs. Gardner, 39 Utah
30, 114 Pac. 147:
''The doctrine reflected in the foregoing
statute has so often been declared to be the law
with respect to the appropriation of water during
the last 25 years that it has become elementary
and is no longer questioned.''
·
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This Court has previously held that an appropriation of water is limited by time as well as by amount,
and that an appropriator's right is limited by the seasonal period during which he has used the same. We
refer to the case of Hardy vs. Beaver ·Cownty Irrigation Company, 65 Utah 28, 234 P. 524, at page 529 (4),
and we quote :
''It is elementary that an appropriation of
water is limited by time as well as by amount;
in other words, that an appropriator's right is
limited by the quantity of water which he has
beneficially used and the seasonal period during
which he has used the same. (Quoting numerous
cases from Western jurisdictions). And in the
case at ·bar the respondents' appropriations must
be limi£.ed to the amount of water they can use
beneficially during the period of the year when
they have actually been accustomed to use the
same .... "
The respondents have the right to apply their
decreed water directly to their lands during the period
of use stated in the Cox Decree and in the manner and
for the purpose for U 1hich such water was decreed. But
respondents have never utilized winter water for summer irrigation, and thus their rights are limited to the
extent of past beneficial use to which they have put the
water.
This statutory provision is in effect a legislative
mandate that no one in the State of Utah has any right
to water, founded on a paper title. Rights to water are
based on beneficial use. In the irrigation field there is
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no. absolute oWnership of \Vater in this state; parties
are only entitled to .obtain a use right. The trial court
erroneously disregarded this fundamental concept, yet
it has been expressed in the very latest decisions of
this court. In U.S. A. vs. District Court, 238 P. 2d
at Page 1134, :Jir. Justice Wade stated:
''The right to the use of water, although a
property right ,is very different from the ownership of specific property which is subject . to
possession, control and use as the owner sees
fit. Such right does not involve the ownership
of a- specific body of water but is only a right
to use a given amount of the transitory waters
of a stream or water source for a specified time,
place and purpose, and a change in any of these
might materially affect the rights of other users
of the sam.e stream or source." (Emphasis added)
And in the same case, Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe
stated at 242 P. 2d Page 778:
''The right to the use of water is very differ~
ent from the fee title to land, largely due to the
very difference in the nature of the two substances. Real estate is fixed while water is fugitive .... The basis, the measure and the limit of
the right to use (water) was what could be used
by each beneficially. What could not be used beneficially was wasted and this could not be permitted."
Once the limit and extent of respondents' rights is
defined and understood, this court can readily realize
why the State Engineer stated in his letter rejecting
the respondents' applications :
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''It is the. opinion of the State Engineer
that the proposed change constitutes an enlargement of a de~reed right, and would adversely
affect existing rights.''
For here is a case in which the respondents for 17
years since the Cox Decree ha.ve had a paper title to
74 cubic second feet of winter water which if used at
all has been applied on frozen ground and completely
returned to the river. This manner of use and the
benefit derived therefrom is the limit and extent of
this wat~r right. To store this water for more beneficial use in the summer on the same lands plus 5000
additional acres is_ clearly an enlargement of the right,
by statutory definition.
(B) DEFINITION AND DETERMINATION OF THE
VESTED RIGHTS OF APPELLANTS.

Appellants' vested rights are determined by the
same standards as those of respondents. It has been
said several times in this brief that the Cox Decree
provides at Page 185 that the Sevier Bridge and Piute
Reservoirs :
''are the owners of the right to store and use
all of the waters yielded by the said Sevier River
for satisfying their rig]lt under." .... (storage
applications which appropriated all of the unappropriated waters of the 'river including unused return flow from the primary users).
The Cox Decree reiterates this theory of what the
storage rights consist:
: ' .. ·.. any and .all water in any way accumulated
In said Reservoirs or otherwise, as water in eX<'ess
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of primary rights, as in this decree defined, shall
be treated as storage water belonging to said
Reservoirs under their filings, and shall be allocated and divided as provided in this decree and
shall be held, released, and otherwise administered in all respects as storage water under the
provisions of this decree governing storage water
accruing to the Piute Reservoir and the Sevier
Bridge Reservoir under their respective filings.''
(Page 195)
This language gives the entire residue of the Sevier
River to the storage companies after the primary users
have taken and used the water. The reasoning and
philosophy of this decreed right is based on more than
75 years of history and settlement along the Sevier
River and the use of its waters. All the original direct
diversions were primarily for summer use when irrigation required the precious water. Then from 1902
to 1912 the. storage companies filed their applications
listed at Page 185 of the Cox Decree to appropriate t;he
river water then unappropriated.
This meant that the storage companies received the
winter flow that was not otherwise put to beneficial use,
and also the spring excesses which were not diverted
into the canals and consumed on the lands of the primary users. It should be remembered that although
the water is decreed to the primary users in terms of
cubic feet per second, this award means nothing more
than the right to dip into the river to the extent of
the beneficial use requirements for the irrigation of the
lands to which the water was decreed. (R. 306) In
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other words if during the month of July, a summer
cloudburst would swell the river at a time when it was
raining on the primary users' lands and therefore the
river flow could not be put to beneficial use, the river
water is not during that period of time decreed to the
primary users. These excesses have not been allowed to
go to waste. They have been captured in the reservoirs
and become storage companies' water to use on their
lands. The reservoirs were built to use what the primary
rights did not use.
Thus the storage companies, since they built their
reservoirs have always had a vested right to this water.
Necessarily this means that both the storage companie~
and the lower primary appropriators have a vested
right in the continuation of the conditions and circumstances that produces such return flow. This is the
lower users' vested right; to have the water continue
to flow down to them as it has in the past. They have
developed farms and built communities based on those
vested rights.
The appellants do not contend that respondents may
not make improvements in the application of water
upon their lands, but under the guise of making such
changes the respondents should not be permitt~d to
store waters for irrigation which they have never used
for such purposes; to use it on lands where it hn~
never been used before or to prevent the water returnin<"0
to the main channel of the river at the ti1ne and in the
quantities it has formerly returned. The appPllants
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have no desire to prevent the respondents from using
the waters of the Sevier River in the same manner,
time and upon the same lands as the respondents ·have
used such water in the last three decades, but the
respondents do not have a latent right at their pleasure to enlarge upon such use at the expens.e of the lo~er
users. Without such rule there ·could be no permanent
improvement or stability on the lower portions of a
river system until lower users had idly awaited the
fullest development in the upper regions of the river
system.
This court's decision in La.sson vs. Seely (Utah,
1951), 238 P. 2d 418 held that a water user did not
have to waste water while it "\vas on his land. The opinion cites and relies upon the following quotation from
Smithfield ;West Bench Irrigation Co. vs. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 105 Utah 468, 472, 142 P. 2d
866!' 868:

''While in his ditch or upon his land it was h~s
property and he could use it as he saw fit. When
the water- reaches the lower end of his land, he
may again gather it into a ditch and convey it to
any other land, ditch or reservoir he desires for
further use; or he may lease it or sell it. But
once the water h~s passed onto the land of
another and out of the control of the user, the
right to use such water passes to the occupant
of the land upon "\\rhich it then is found, or may
become water unused by anyone and subject to
capture and use by the first person to capture
and use it. If while so free, it flows into another
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stream it becomes
(Emphasis added)

part

of

such

stream.''

The important distinction of these two cases is
that they both concerned summertime irrigation practices by a single individual. This court reasoned that

while the water was on his lwnd the irrrigator did not
have to waste it, but he could use it as he saw fit. Appellants have no quarrel with the principle of permitting respondents to make the most beneficial use of the
water while it is on their land. But this does not mean
that they can build a reservoir on the main channel of
the river upstream from their lands and store water
instead of using it. Nor does the doctrine of Lasson
vs. Seely mean that respondents are presently entitled
to flood waters which have never been diverted into
their canals nor beneficially used. The excessive amount
of winter water was awarded resp-ondents because there
was no conswmp·tive use which would prevent the storage
companies from later acquiring it. As long as respondents u~SE the wat~r on their lands during the periods
of time that the decree provides, the appellants will
be protected. Respondents want to store this water
when not needed and thus acquire water to irrigate
5000 acres of additional land.
Respondents were apparently successful in convincing the trial court that under the above-mentioned
language of Lasson vs. Seely and the Smithfield West
Bench case that they "had the right to take their water
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in· a bucket and dump it in the Colorado River; that
the water belonged to them to do whatever they pleas·ed
with it." The application of these cases to the Sevier
River in this manner is fallacious and constitutes reversible error. It. is diametrically opposed to the fundamental principle of continuous re-use of the waters
of the Sevier River, by which principle the maximum
amount of benefit is achieved, in that each party in
turn USE'S the waters and the return flow is immediately re-used by lower appropriators. If all primary
users were permitted to build reservoirs and hold up
their water for use in July and August the only water
right worth anything would be to have a point of diversion at the head of the river. The lower reaches of the
Sevier system would be reclaimed by the desert.
The lower appropriators on the Sevier River have
a vested right in the return flow from the use and
direct application of winter water by respondents. Or
to put it another way, the lower users have a vested
right which compels the continuation of the past practice of respondents using the water and not storing or
holding it up.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit G shows that for the ten-year
period 1940 to 1949 inclusive the average flow of the
Sevier River past the Hatch measuring station has
been as follows :
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5.2

MONTH

FLOW OF RIVER

COX DECREE

IN CUBIC

AWARDS

SECOND FEET

RESPONDENTS

November ---------~---------------- 73.24
December -------------------------- 66.2 ·
January ---------------------------- 61.78
February -------------------------- 64.14
March -------------------------------- 72.69
April ---------------------------------- 143.5
May ------------------------------------ 377.1
June ----------.. ------------------------- 263.0
July ------------------------------------ 114.9
August ------------------------------ 90.4
~eptell1ber --------------------~--- 79.7
October ------------------------------ 79.87

74
74
74
74
74
337.86
337.86
337.86
337.86
337.86
337.86
337.86

Respondents (Panguitch Valle~_ and Circle Valley)
have a decreed winter __ water right of 74 cubic second
feet and a summer flow right of 337.86 cubic ·second
feet. These figures are the sum total for all the first,
second and third class rights of all of the respondents
in this case. It can be seen that these amounts as
awarded by the Cox Decree exceed the flow of the river
at Hatch in every month of the year except May when
there is a 40 second foot surplus in the river. If the
doctrine of Lasson vs. Seely applied ·to this case entitles
respondents to STORE the water instead on U·SING it
under guise of not wasting it, then the ultimate conclusion would be that they could da1n up the river at
Hatch and throughout the entire year release only 40
second feet during the month of !fay!
As we are here painstakingly trying to point out,
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the respondents h~ve only a vested right to "Q.Se their
water a,nd if that use i~ t:Qe wintertime results in a
large return flow to the river, as it necessarily must,
then appellants have a vested :r;ight to such return flow.
In defining the vested rights of the parties in order
to determine whether this change will enlarge one
right at the expense or impa~rment of the other, the
respondents cannot ''lean just a ~ittle bit'' on the
doctrine of Lasson vs. Seely and contend that they
need not waste their excess winter ·water but we can store
it, unless they are willing to argue to this court that
as a matter of right!, under definition of Uta,h law,
~very primary user on every river system in the state
is likewise entitled to store his water in a reservoir
located on the. main channel of the river anq hold it,
rather than use it. As long as respondents US·E their
water on their lands during the prescribed period, the
~dministration of the Sevier River wiU be peacefully
maintained. But storing winter water for summer use
does :p.ot constitute winter use. Upon this winter use
the appellants rely.
In the ·case of In re North Powder River, 75 Ore.
83, 93, 144 P. 485, 488, the distinction between owning
the water itself and owning the right to use it is clearly
pointed out. The opinion states:
''Although some of the text-writers and the
decisions of some of the courts seem to recognize
that the appropriator may sell the water separately from the land, this is only upon the theory
that th~ appropriator owns the water, and not
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merely the right to the use of it for a particular
purpose; but, in states in which legislation relating to the use of water has been enacted, it
is not the water but the use of it for a particular
purpose that is the limit of the right, and, when
not needed for that purpose, the next person in
priority of time is entitled to it, and a prior
appropriator cannot sell it to a stranger to the
injury of a subsequent appropriator. This is the
case in Colorado, Wyoming, and Montana, and
our own state in 1909 adopted the same rule by
enacting section 6668, L.O.L. ''
It is well settled that appropriators from a natural
stream having certain decreed rights are entitled to
have the conditions existing upon the stream at the
date of their appropriations substantially maintained
unless the change sought will not materially injure
them. Fort Collins Milling and E. Co. vs. Larimer ~·
Weld Irrigation Co., 61 Colo. 45, 156 Pac. 140 (citing
many Colorado cases); City and Cownty of Denver vs.
·Colorado Land ~ Livestock, 86 Colo. 184, 279 Pac. 46;
Baker vs. City of Pueblo, 87 Colo. 489, 289 Pac. 603;
Crockett vs. Jones, 47 Idaho 497, 277 Pac. 550. When
the water is not actually required by an appropriator
or is not used, it is at the disposition 6f others according to their respective rights and it must be permitted
to flow down to them as it is wont to flow. Williams vs.
Altnow, 51 Oregon 275, 95 Pac. 200.
Therefore, to recapitulate:
(a) Respondents' vested rights are limited by the
beneficial use to which they have put the water. They
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are entitled to use it in the manner and time and £or
th pu~pose for which such water was decreed. Respondents do not have a vested right to store their water.
(b) Appellants have a vested right to have respondents use their water at a specified time and place
and for the particular purpose specified in the State
Engineer's Proposed Determination and the Cox Decree.
(c) THE DECREE APPROVING THE APPLICATIONS

ENLARGES THE VESTED RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS AT
THE EXPENSE AND IMPAIRMENT OF APPELLANTS'
VESTED RIGHTS.

The fundamental issue in this case is whether or
not the respondents' proposed change of use from a
direct flow application to storage and subsequent use
on the same lands or on 5000 acres of new land in an
entirely different season of the year can be accomplished
without damaging the very important rights of lower
users. The issue is not whether the acquisition of more
water to put on 5000 additional acres of land will be
beneficial to the respondents, or whether they can irrigate more efficiently if they have a dam to store water
in. The issue is-will this constitute an enlargement
of their rights and will it impair appellants' rights 1
Respondents apparently impressed the trial court with
the obvious fact that if they got more water, they
would be better off. The State Engineer's decision was
reversed and the applications were approved on the
basis of this argument and in the name of progress.
(R. 1119). Yet in the Delta-Fillmore region there are
thousands of acres of better lands which have been
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cleared and plowed and where ditches have been dug,
but are bar:ren for lack of water. This Delta-Fillmore
land has a longer growing season and can produce
highly cultivated garden crops rath.er than pasturage.
(Fillmore growing season, 133 days; Delta, 116 day8;
Panguitch 78 qays; Pltf. Ex. 54 page 65.) The order
of the lower court is that respondents may proceed with
the construction of the reservoir and administer themselves, the a1nount of return flow that passes the Kingston Gaging Statio11 and reaches the Piute Reservoir
to fulfill the lower users' vested rights. The decree
authorizes this expensive reservoir to be constructed
without any workable formula attached to safeguard
appellants' rights in accordance with the Cox Decree.
The conditions which were improvised are entirely inconsistent with one another and are on their face directly
in conflict with the provisions of the ·Cox Decree. The
provisions of the judgment permitting measurement of
water past the Kingston Gaging Station in three-month
periods comparable to similar years is arbitrary and
capricious and has no basis in law.
In order to justify the approval of the change
applications the trial court has erroneously placed undue
str~ss upon the very obvious facts expressed in findings (No. 12) that during July, August and September,
irrigation is of the most importance to applicants; (No.
~6) that the construction of the reservoir near Hatch
as proposed by applicants is physically and economically feasible; (No. 19) that the construction and opera-
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tion of the Piute and Sevier Bridge Reservoir has
resulted in more efficient use of water and therefore
the proposed Hatch Reservoir would likewise improve
and make for a more beneficial and efficient use. But
the trial court overlooked the fact that the crux of this
case is that this increased efficiency cannot be achieved
with another person's water. Appellants have at all
tin1es admitted, and this court can take judicial notice
of the fact that any group of· ranchers will be benefited if they can devise a plan whereby they can store
water in a reservoir (which water has previously
fio\Yed down the river during winter months) so that
it can be released during the irrigation season, or be
''on call'' or otherwise and used upon additional and
new lands.
Water cannot be two places at the same time. A~
simple as this principle appears, the trial court overlooked it. Either the storage companies do or they do not
have the right to receive water during the storaget season. This right vvhich they claim, was established and
prescribed by the General Adjudication Decree of the
Sevier River entered in 1936 by Judge Cox. The respondents claim no storage rights under the Cox
decree. (Ex. 53, R. 4, 5) The Panguitch and Circle
Valley people got an excessive amount of winter water
decreed as a direct fiovv use, excessive because all parties knew the water would be used for culinary purposes
and the watering of livestock and would then return to
the stream. The vested right of the storage companies
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1s to receive the winter water for which respondents
have no need. The storage companies have received
the winter flow for more than thirty years. If the
storage companies do not have the right to insist on
receiving this winter water then they will never receive
it at all. The problem is whether Piute or Hatch gets
this winter flow. For as the witness, T. Clark Callister
testified:
''If you withhold 13,000 acre feet in this
(Hatch) reservoir in April that ordinarily would
have gone to the (Piute) reservoir, you take
13,000 acre feet out of the (Piute) reservoir.
That's simple as A. B. C." (R. 689)
The witnesses for appellants all testified that to
impound winter water at H.atch for summer irrigation
on the same lands plus 5000 additional acres would, of
a certainty, impair lower users' vested rights. Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Israelson, was asked if the use of
stored water later in the season would decrease the
amount of water available to downstream users (R. 252).
He replied : ''It is my opinion that the storage of the
13,650 acre feet as proposed would not decrease the
annual flow to the lower users'' (emphasis added). This
careful selection of language shows that Israelson only
thought that the water if applied on the same lands would
eventually, within a year's time reach the lower users.
Immediately, upon cross-examination he stated that the
time of return flow would be changed (R. 253), but he
thought that the Piute Reservoir would iron out any
differences; that it ''Tould give the downstream us~rs
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adequate protection for change in time of return flow.
This testimony is the whole foundation of respondents'
case that vested rights would not be impaired, yet if the
time of return flow is changed, which Dr. Israelson admitted it \Vould be, the water will be taken from other
users which injury Dr. Israelson ignored.
I

Israelson also testified that if the water was appli~d
to the new lands, the time and quantity of return flow
would be changed. He stated that the return flow would
be nearly the same if a very subst.antial chwnge in practice on 10,000 waterlogged acres was made (R. 256).
This issue of the waterlogged acres is foreign to this
case as it was not made a part of the applications or
the pleadings or the findings and decree. (R. 107) The
gist of Israelson's testimony. is that the quantity of
return flow would be very substantially reduced when
the water was applied to the new land and that appellants' vested rights will be impaired both as to time
and quantity of return flow by the approval of respondents' applications. Respondents in this regard not only
completely failed in their burden of proving that _5000
ne\v acres could be irrigated and winter water impounded until the following summer without injuring
appellants, but Israelson's testimony admits that lower
appropriators' vested rights will be impaired. In
.American Fork ~Irrigation Company vs. Linke (Utah
1951), 239 P. 2d 188, this court stated:
''We recognize plaintiffs' duty to prove that
vested rights will not be impaired by approval
of their application, but we also recognize that
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such duty must not be niade unreasonably onerous, to the point where every remote but presently
indeterminable vested right must be pinpointed."
Because the right to change the point of diversion
is a conditional right and does not exist at all unless it
can be exercised without injury to other vested right$,
the party who asserts such right has the burden of
proving. that the change will not injuriously affect the
vested rights of others although this may involve proof
of a negative. Irrigation Co. vs. Water Supply and
Storage Co., 49 Colo. 1, 111 P~c. 610; Farmers' High
Line Canal & Reservoir ·Co. vs. 'Wolff, 23 Colo. App.
570, 131 P. 291.
It is not enough to merely provide in the judgment and decree that the applications are approved
"on the conditions that no vested rights will be impaired" for the hearings before the State Engineer and
before the District Court are brought for the determination of this very issue. The question presented for administrative or judicial determination is whether it is probable or improbable that the change applications will
result in vested rights being impaired if approved.
Eardly vs. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. (2) 362 at page
365; Whitmore vs. Murray City, i07 Utah 445, 154 P. (2)
748 at page 750; United States vs. District ·Court (Utah),
238 P. (2) 1132 at page 1135.
Appellants contend that the trial court failed to
appreciate the importance of the time of return flow
to the protection of lower users' vested rights.
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Respondents' :plan of "bunching up" their rights
to IJlake fl. greater use of w~ter during t4e hot dry
summer months cannot possibly operate without upsetthlg the basis of the Co~ Decree ~n<l the a,.dm.inistration of the Sevier River as it operates under that decree.
Respondents will acquire more summer water than was
originally decreed to them. It was the intent and purpose of the Cox Deere~ to give the wint~r w&ters to
the primary users for direct application only and for
t4e wjnter season only. This fact is borne out by th~
t~me of use $pecified in the d.ecree. All water users have
their winter flow and summer flow separately sta,ted.
Thus, at page 9 of the Decree, the primary right of the
respondents is set forth for the period of use Ma,rch
15th to November 15th and they share proportionately
in the lump award of 44 cubic feet per second for use
during the period from November 15th to March 15th
(page 10 of the Decree). Bacon's Bible which is the
Proposed Determination of Water Rights on the Sevier
River by the State Engineer (Defend~nts' Exhibit 52)
and which document is the basis for the Cox Decree
classifies this winter water a,s "Domestic". For instance,
the Long Canal Co. at page 15 of Exhibit 52 was to
receive 5 c.f.s. for "Domestic ... use of 75 persons and
1000 head of stock". It was culinary water.
It becomes perfectly obvious that the change applications constitute an enlargement of the respondents"
rights when we consider the provisions of Section
73-3-3, U. C.A. 1953, which provides :
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''Any person entitled to the use of water
may change the place of diversion or use and
may use the water for other purposes than those
for which it was originally appropriated, but no
such change shall be made if it impairs any vested
right without just compensation. Such changes
may be perma!lent or temporary. Changes for
an indefenite length of time with an intention to
relinguish the original point of diversion, place
or purpose of use are defined as permanent
changes." (Emphasis added)
The above statute clearly indicates that in order
to secure a permanent change of point of diversion or
place or purpose of use, there must be a definite intention to relinquish the original point of diversion, or
place or purpose of use, and not to retain the original
place and purpose of use and acquire a new and additional place and purpose of use. The respondents'
applications clearly show they do not propose to relinquish anything pertaining to their present beneficial
use or place of use, but on the contrary their applications show and their testimony discloses that they intend
to continue the irrigation of all of the lands for whic11
their water was awarded, and to irrigate 5000 acres in
addition thereto, and that they intend to use all of their
summer direct flow rights on all of their lands and in
addition thereto use their winter flow rights, for which
they have had no past beneficial use, in the summer
months, thus giving them a double summer water right.
If this court should permit the respondents to
change their less valuable winter flow rights into suulmer use on 5000 new acres of land, then every \vinter
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flow user up and do\vn the stream will likewise seek the
same thing. In fact there are several irrigation and
canal companies who are defendants and appellants in
the present action and who have already selected reservoir sites to store their own winter water, should
the court ever hold that such can be done. To mentio!l
a few of such reservoir sites, there is one at the head
of Circleville Canyon and another one in the vicinity
of Marysvale, and Junction. Dams could be built at
these sites of sufficient size to impound all of the water
which is now received by Sevier Bridge and Piute Reservoirs combined. (R. 1110)
Water is needed primarily for irrigation in the
growing season. That is the time when parties are
anxious about the size of their stream. The storage
companies primarily rely on what they acquire during
the winter and early spring runoff. Thus if the court
should now determine that winter rights can be stored
and held for summer use, an entirely new principle will
be injected into the Cox Decree. Seventy-five years of
water administration on the Sevier River will be thrown
aside. Consternation will reig-n. Here we have a case
where the evidence demonstrates conclusively that there
is total consumption of the waters of the river. If the
change sought by respondents increases their beneficial
use, as they allege it will, then such change is certain
to adversely effect the beneficial use now derived from
the waters by appellants. The river is so perfectly
harnessed that every disturbance must injure some
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one. As the court state·d in Hutchinson vs. Stricklin
146 Oregon 285, 28 P. 2d 225, 228:
'' Th~ system adopted by the lawmakers of
this state, in the w~ter code and its amendments
and other statutes, when the water rights of the
several parties on a stream and its tributaries
have be~n adj~dicated, m~.y be liken~d to a net. .
work, all the differ~nt parts of which form a complete whole. To a certain extent, one right depends upon another, and if a part of the network
is displaced it will disarrange and prejudice the
other parties, although the part removed is a,
prior right, with a date of relative priority,
earlier than many of the other rights, and it
would_ be ~omething like taking a link out of a
chain.''
'

'

This same basic scientific fact, to-wit: That where
a stream has been entirely appropriated, an increased
use of the waters in one part of the system must result
in a corresponding decreased use in another part, h~s
also been expressed by the Supreme Court of Colorado.
In Farmers' High Line Canal q Reservoir Co. vs. Wolff,
23 Colo. App. 570, 131 P. 291-295, the court stated:
"It is a matter of common kno\vledge that,
except on streams in which the appropriations
have not exceeded the constant supply, few
instances arise in which the change of place of
diversion of large quantities of water for a long
distance, can be made without substa~ tial injury
to juniors, and the utmost care and scrutiny is
required to guard against such injury.''
The case at bar insofar as it concerns the approval
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of the applications which propose to irrigate 5000 acres
.of new land is identical with Enlarged Southside lr1'"igation Di.tch Co. et al. vs. John's Flood Ditch Co., et al.
(Colo.), 210 P. 2d 982 wherein the court stated:
''Counsel for defendants in error discuss at
length the question of changed place of use, and
cite authority pertinent thereto, but nowhere is
there any substantial evidence or contention of
decreased acreage or decreased use of these water
rights on the lands for which they.were appropriated and on which they are still used. The· end
sought here is not changed use, but additional use.
It is not sought to use the water to irrigate lands
under the Model tract instead of using it upon
the Hoehne lands for irrigation for which it was
decre~d; rather it is sought to continue full irrigation of the lands for which it was decreed, and
even to increase such use, .and at the same time
to irrigate additional lands therewith, thus increasing the length of time of diversion and continuing the use of water which should be returned
to the stream for th~ benefit of other appropriators. This may not be done.'' (Italics added)
In the earlier Colorado case, Ft. Lyon ·C.anal Compa;ny vs. Chew, 33 Colo. 392, 81 Pac. 37, the court said:
''The appropriation must be made in connection with some particular tract of land, and,
though it be not essential to its continued existence that the application shall be forever confined to the identical land for which the diversion
was made, yet, so long as the water is used in connection With that land, it cannot be made to do
duty thereto, and at the same time or in the same
season be used for the irrigation of some other
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tract, as against the rights of other appropriators
which have theretofore attached.''
(Italics
added)
There are two Colorado cases which concern the
question of a primary user's right to store its irrigation
waters. In Colorado Milling and Elevator Company vs.
Larimer and 'Weld lr,rigation Company, 26 Colorado 47,
56 Pac. 185, the court held that the defendant irrigation
company could. not store its waters which were decreed
to it for a direct flow use and thereby cut down the size
of the stream which plaintiff milling company needed
for its mill-race. In this case, like the instant one, the
irrigation company sought to store its direct flow rights
after a statutory adjudication had settled the rights of
the respective parties on Cache La Poudre River ia
Larimer County, Colorado. The entire opinion could
profitably be quoted in this brief, but to paraphrase,
the court held : That the decree gran ted a direct flow
right, that the decree did not contemplate or provide for
the storage of such water, that the irrigation company
in effect sought to D?-ake another appropriation for another purpose or use ''at a time when the water thus
taken was not needed for the use for which it was originally appropriated", that the irrigation company could
change its use from that for which it was originally
appropriated and decreed but it could not exercise this
right in such manner as to infringe on the rights of
the plaintiff. In its opinion the court emphasizes the
fact that the irrigation company could not change it~
decreed direct flow right into a storage right to the
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detriment of the plaintiff milling company ''by an enlarged or another use, measured by either volume or
ti'me which would result in depriving plaintiff of its
appropriation under that decree". This case clearly
expresses appellants' contentions as to the importance
of time of return flow under the Cox Decree.
In Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. vs. New Loveland ~
Greely Irrigation ~ Land Co., 40 Colo. 382, 93 Pac. 485,
a storage of irrigation waters was permitted in an
opinion written by the same Judge (Gabbert J.) who
wrote the Colorado Milling and Elevator case. It does.
not appear from the opinion that there were any lower
users on the stream whose rights were jeopardized.
The opinion states: ''This change is in no manner
detrimental to the rights of the appellee".

There has been considerable argument and discussion both before the State Engineer and in the trial
of thi~ case before the District Court concerning Amer,i~
cwn Fork Irrigation Co. vs. Linke (Utah 1951), 239 P.
2d 188. In that case the Supreme Court of Utah (Mr.
Justice Henriod) affirmed the District Court's determination that the vested rights of the parties opposing
a change application whereby direct-flow rights would
be stored for subsequent summer use would not be
impaired.
In the American Fork case the applicant irrigation companies proposed to build a mountain reservoir
with a capacity of 1000 acre feet on the headwaters of
American Fork Canyon. The proposed reservoir site
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was about 15 miles from the applicants' diversion weir
at the mouth of American: Fork Canyon. The applicants
proposed to store the high spring runoff from April
1 to June 15 of each year.. The stored water was to be
released between April .1 and October 30. The water
was to be applied to the same ground which applicants
had previously irrigated. There was no additional land
to he developed in that case such as the 5000 new acres
recently acquired by respondents herein. The drainage
and percolation of the stored waters when applied to
the same. lands would reach Utah Lake in the late
summer months. The surface evaporation from Utah
Lake averaged about 231,000 acre feet between May 1
and September 1 as compared to an average flow into
the Jordan River of 207,000 acre f~et during the same
period of time. The protestants to the American Fork
Irrigation Co.; 's application were Kennecott Copper
Corporation, Utah Po:wer & Light Company and various
canal companies in Salt Lake ·County who took their
water from the Jordan River. Besides American Fork
Creek, Utah Lake receives its supply from Battle Creek,
Grove Creek, Alpine Creek and Fort Canyon Creek as
well as the Provo River through the Provo Reservoir
Canal. David I. Gardner, Utah Lake Commissioner,
testified in that case that the evaporation from Utah
Lake was greater than both evaporation and transpiration from the cultivated areas lying easterly from the
Lake. There was also evidence that in 1948 30 000 acre
' Lake
'
feet of water had been wasted into Great Salt
and
at the time of trial in March, 1951 the volume of water
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wasting into Great Salt Lake was estimated at between
200 and 275 second feet. (Volume 615, Bound Briefs
of the Supreme Court of Utah) Thus the opinion of
Mr. Justice Henriod states:
"This case is based on its own peculiar facts
and is not a precedent for ~y where facts may
differ .... In storing the 1000 feet of water the
surface area at the dam would be about equal
to the increaseds-grface area therein. The evaporation at the higher elevation of the proposed dam
admittedly would be less, probably one-half than
at the Lake. Surface evaporation oil. the Lake
actually exceeds the amount flowing out of the
Lake and ayailable to defendants between May
and September.'' (Emphasis added)
The very important differences in the American
Fork case are :
(1) The large volume of water wasted into Great

Salt Lake. (2) Utah Lake evaporation (231,000 acre
feet) served as an overwhelming factor to any possible
impairment of vested rights by the storage of 1000 acre
feet. (In the instant case the evaporation loss at the
Hatch Town dam is 300 acre feet more than if the same
water were stored in the Piute Reservoir (R. 397, 398) ).
(3) The later use of the stored waters was made in
the same season and on the same lands that had previously been irrigated. (In the instant case applicants
intend to use a winter right (non-consumptive) for summer consumptive use. In the American Fork case there
was no increased acreage such as the 5000 acres p-roposed
to be developed in this case.) (4) There was no problem
I
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of lapse of time of return flo"'... affecting the seasonal
rights of the storage companies and the primary users
in the Sevier Valley. (5) The problem of administering the trial court's decree so as not to impair vested
rights was delegated to the State Engineer and not
given to the change-applicants as in the instant case,
It is the development of the 5000 acres of new
land and the bunching up of winter water for more
extensive summer use which has always been objectionable to the protestants in the instant case. These features were not present in the American Fork Irrigation
Co. case. Because of the close proximity of the irrigated lands in Circle Valley to the Piute Reservoir the
impairment of the vested storage rights if the respondents' plan is successful can be foreseen as a matter of
absolute certainty.
No engineers, experts, college professors or government administrators can convince the farmers and
settlers on the lower part of the Sevier River that they
will not be hurt if this court permits the upper users to
store, winter water for which they have had no past
need, for a summer use. The evaporation, loss in transit
through the canal, and consumptive use on the 5000
acres of new land will totally consume the 13,000 ·acre
feet of water which is proposed to be stored in the
reservoir. The trial court's decree permitting respondents to store and concentrate their water for an increasea
summer use IF they do not impair vested rights of
lower users is as paradoxical as an order to jump up

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

71
in the air, but don't come down. The impossibility of an
attempt at either can be foreordained.
POINT 4
THE DECREE TAKES FROM THE STATE ENGINEER
AND THE RIVER COMMISSIONERS THE ADMINISTRA·
TION OF THE RIVER ABOVE THE KINGSTON GAGING
STATION AND UNLAWFULLY VESTS SUCH ADMINISTRATION IN THE RESPONDENTS.

The trial court ''literally threw the book'' at appellants. In approving respondents' change applications subject to the condition that "the yield of the
river at Kingston Measuring Station on the South Fork
of the Sevier River shall be maintained as it would have
been under similar periods of time in previous similar
years," (Paragraph 7 of the Judgement and Decree,
Judgement Roll 59), the trial court delegated the duty
to administer such conditions to the respondents! Finding Number 19 states:
''But in view of the fact that the applicants
propose in addition to setting up an 'on call' system at Hatch, to also irrigate new lands in Garfield County, and to level and otherwise 'modernize' the farm lands in Piute and Garfield
Counties, all of which would ordinarily entail a
very complicated situation insofar as the distribution of the waters of the South Fork of the
Sevier River is concerned, and that the State
Engineer (and the water commissioners) should
not be charged with the direct responsibility of
seeing to it that the defendants get their full
water rights at Kingston station on the South
Fork of the Sevier River between 16 March and
14 November, inclusive of each year while plaintiffs operate under said applications, but that
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duty should be charged to plaintiffs as a condition to the approval of their several applicatio~s." (Emphasis added)
What kind of law is this 1 These appellants should
never be required to permit the respondents to pick and
choose some '' similar period of ·time in previous similar
years'' and thereby fix the amount of water that appellants get. The last guardian in the world to whom appellants would entrust the resp·onsibility of seeing that the1r
vested decreed rights are not impaired are these respondents. Under the Cox Decree the storage companies are en titled to all the water not used by the primary users and the statute only permits a change if
these vested rights are not impaired. The only possible
manner by which respondents can fill their proposed
reservoir and contend that the appellants' vested rights
are not impaired is through the margin of leeway allowed to them in selecting some other ''similar period
of time''.

As shown by plaintiff's Exhibit G, reproduced at
page 20 of this brief, the flow of the river past the
Kingston Gaging Station during the month of June
has varied from 9.2 cubic second feet (1946) to 481
cubic second feet (1941). Thus the tremendous amount
of latitude granted respondents to pick and choose
some other similar period of time to determine what
water appellants are entitled to receive can be appreciated. The River Commissioners with their experience
and background in administering the waters under the
Cox Decree are much more competent than respondents
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to handle any ''complicated situation insof3rr as the
distribution of the waters of the South Fork of the
Sevier River is concerned".
The provisions of the Utah statute r~l~_ting to the
appointment of river comw.issioners do not provide for,
nor do they contemplate, the appointment of a group of
partisan water users such as respondents to administer
th~ flow of a river. The pertinent provisions of the
statute are: (All citations are to Utah Code~ Annot~te,d,
1953)
73-2~1

''He (State Engineer) shall have general administrative supervision of the waters of th~
state, and of the measurement, appropriation, apportionment and distribution thereof. He shaJl
have power to make and publish such rules and
regulations as may be necessary from time to
time fully to C'arry out the duties of his office,
and p~rticularly to secure the equitable and fair
apportionment and distribution of the water according to the respective rights of appropriators.''

73-5-1
''Whenever in the judgment of the state
engineer, or the district court, it is necessary
to appoint one or more water commissioners for
the distribution of water from any river system
or water source, such commissioner or commissioners shall be appointed annually by the state
engineer, after consultation with the water users.
The form of such consultation and notice to be
given shall be determined by the state engineer
as shall best suit local conditions, full expression
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of majority opinion being, however, provided
for.''
73-5-3
''The state engineer and his duly authorized
assistants shall carry into effect the judgments
of the courts in relation to the division, distribution or use of water under the provisions of this
title."

There are several conflicting and incomplete expressions in the findings as to just how the Judgment and
Decree of the lower court is to be administered, but
it,is apparent that the trial court considered the interest
of respondents antagonistic to that of the State Engineer and the presently appointed Sevier River Commissioners. This was due to the contradictory testimony of
the amount of winter water which respondents testified
that they used in the past several years compared to the
river commissioners' report of the winter diversions actually made. Notwithstanding the fact the River Commissioners based their records on mechanical devices which
devices were found by the ·court to be reasonably accurate and upon actual measurements and estimates made
by the water commissioners the court found that such
records "do not accurately reflect all of the water diverted by plaintiffs during freezing weather and particularly is this true as to the winter water". Therefore the trial court attempted to relieve the State
Engineer's office of any and all authority above the
Kingston Gaging Station and to give respondents a
free hand in selecting a ''similar period of time'' in
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order to determine what amounts of water need be
supplied in order to fulfill appellants' vested rights.
Paragraph 7 of the Judgment and Decree (Judgment
Roll 60) does not contemplate that the River Commissioners and the respondents shall work together but said
paragraph states:

''And shguld any dispute arise between the
River Commissioners and the plaintiffs concerning the amount of water to be delivered at the
above point between the periods of time above
specified, such dispute shall be referred by either
or both of said parties to the :State Engineer who
shall (in aid of the court) summarily determine
such question, using the formula set out in this
and the following paragraph of this Decree.''
(Emphasis added)
The statutory purpose for appointing water commissioners is to select a non-partisan commissioner to diatribute and apportion the waters of a river. The river
commissioner is to be appointed annually by the State
Engineer 73-5-1, supra. In Minersville Reservoir and
Irrigation Co. vs. Rocky Ford Irrigation Co., 90 Utah
283, 61 P. 2d 605, the Supreme Court of Utah stated:
''The primary purpose of a water commissioner is to assist the court in carrying out its
decrees. His duties are to aid the courts and the
state engineer in the distribution to the various
water users of the quantity of water to which each
is entitled. The commissioner is an arm of the
court and the state engineer in enforcing and
protecting the various water users in their rights.
He is appointed by the state engineer upon recom-
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mendation of the interested water users. The
, state engineer may remove him for cause upon an
applic~tion of a water user and a he1\ring h~d
thereon. The same power i,:p.heres in the co-u.rt
under which he serves . . . . The authority and
duty of a com·missioner to distribute water to one
or more users holding the right to the use thereof
does not cease merely because one of them has
undertaken to -maintain a mea;ns of storing and
conveying s~ch water to the place of use. If such
a construction were given to the law it would,
in many instances, fail in its purpose." (Em-phasis added)
In CaldweU v. Erick~on, (il Utah 265, 213 Pfl,c. 182,
there is a complete discussion of the legislative intent
concerning passage of the statutes with which we are
presently concerned. The holding of that decision h;:

''. ~ .. th,a,t the Legi~lature must pave deliberately
intended that the state engineer should be given
such control, and that the appointment of a commissioner by him, when lawfully made, should
s:p.persede a,ny appointment made by the court,
under ·~ former decree.''
There is no authority or pretext of judicial fairness
1n relieving the state engineer and the river commissioners whom he has appointed of the administration
of the wa.ters of the Sevier River above the Kingston
Gaging Station and delegating that duty to respondents;
particularly to allow respondents to select ''some similar
period of time'' as the measuring rod of appellants'
rights. The presently appointed River Con1missioners
who have ad1ninistered the waters in Panguitch and
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Circle 'Talley fqr t~e past tel). yea~s are the proper
persons tq po~tinue to do so. Fo:u a court to appoipt one
of th~ pa:rti~s in a- highly contested water case to serve
as a commissioner whose dut~e~ are: (1) to determ~~~
what the other party's rights are, and (2) s~e tp.at
those r~ghts are fulfilled, is a miscarriage of judicial
authority.
POINT 5
(A) THE DECREE IN EFFECT A~ROGATES THE COX
DECREE NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT WERE MERELY TO REVIEW
T~E STf\TE ENGINEER'S REJECTION OF RESPONDENTS'
APPLICATION$.
, . . ~ -.
,

Prior to the decision of the trial court in this ,case,
the distribution and apportionment of all the waters
of the Sevier River were administered under the Cq4
Decree. Now, in effect there is a Jones Decree which
governs the river above the Kingston Gaging Station.
The amount of water which p~sses the Kingston station will no longer be the normal retq.rn flow from the
application of the waters to the same lands and at the
same time as was provide~ in the Proposed Determination and the Cox Decree. The triaJ court's improvised
form-q.la and respondents choice of a ''similar period of
time'' thereunder will now control the amount that is
to be let down to appellants. The Qo~ Decree has been
rescinded insofar as it prescribed a period of winter
use from November 15th to March 15th. The provisions
of time which are specified in the Cox Decree have no
meaning insofar as respondents are concerned. And
because the Cox Decree has been abrogated in the~e
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provisions the amounts of cubic feet per second awarded
for summer use·may also be disregarded by respondents
for they now have the trial court's approval to apply
greater amounts of summer water to their lands. How
much greater is left to their discretion.
·Under respondents theory as expressed In their
applications:
''Water will be stored when not needed~ and
when needed the water will be run throvgh the
reservoir. This is in order to improve the use
of the water, conserving it when not needed for
use in more critical seasons of the year. '' (Pis.
Ex. A, a-2329, Emphasis added)
Certainly, the Cox Decree did not award to any
one water that 'vas not needed, and on the contrary the
Cox Decree provides at page 231:
"That the rights herein decreed are founded
upon appropriations of water for beneficial uses,
and the ·rights herein decreed are subject to the
condition that they are required and necessary for
beneficial uses, and such rights are subject to the
limitations and conditions that the same are used
for beneficial purposes, economically and without waste. Any water diverted from the said
river and/ or its tributaries, not beneficially used
under the rights of the respective parties to this
decree shall be returned to the river by the most
practical and direct route.''
The Cox Decree only awarded the primary users a
right to dip into the river and take therefron1 when
the 'vater was needed and could be put to beneficial use.
The beneficial use for which the winter water was decreed
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''From November 15th to March 15th'' of each year was
certainly not a beneficial use in the following July and
August.
The Jones Decree has changed and modified every
provision of the Cox Decree. The stated cubic feet
per second that was awarded respondents for summer
use \Vill now be exceeded. The decreed cubic feet per second were taken as the basis for all of respondents' exhibits and charts to show how they would store 13,000
acre feet of water. Thus, provisions as to time, place,
purpose and beneficial use that have always been so important in the exercise and owner ship of water rights
have been scrapped and ignored while the paper title to
so many cubic feet per second awarded in the decree
is claimed as respondents' vested rights without regard
to the other inherent elements that attend this use right.
(B) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDIC-

TION TO MAKE ANY INTERPRETATION, CONSTRUCTION
OR MODIFICATION OF THE COX DECREE AND THE
COURT'S ACTION IN THIS RESPECT WAS UNLAWFUL
AND VOID. UNDER THE GUISE OF REVIEWING THE
ACTION OF THE STATE ENGINEER THE TRIAL COURT
UNLAWFULLY ADJUDICATED WATER RIGHTS.

In United States v. District Court (Utah 1951), 238
P. 2d 1132, this court speaking through Mr. Justice
Wade stated at page 1136 :
''The district court's judgment in reviewing
the engineer's decision is limited to the issues
determinable by the engineer and in general has
the same effect as though it were made by him.
The question to be determined is whether or not
under the facts established in that court the
engineer's decision should be upheld or reversed
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taking ipto account the stat~tory powers of the
engineer ~ut the court may not Q.eter~~ne i~sp.~~
not within the pow~r of the engineer to determin~.
In the case of an application to ~ppropriate or
to change the place of qiversion 0! use, it merely
approves or rejects the application without determining the priorities of the parties, .... '~
A long line of Utah decisions were cited, and are authority for the above quoted excerpt. They are: In r~
Application 7600, 63 Utah 311, 225 P. 605; Eardley v~
Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. 2d 362; Tanner v. Bacon, 103
Utah 494, 136 P. 2d 957; Whitmore v. Murray City, 107
Utah 445, 154 P. 2d 748.
+n the instant case, the district court ~ot on~:r
adjudicated water rights and determined priorities~
(Finding of Facts, Nos. 6, 7, and 11) it set forth ~
forrp.ula by which appellants' vested water rights are
purportedly measured and determined. Par~graph 7
of the Judgment and Decree (Judgm~nt Roll 58) provides that appellants are entitled to:
''. . . . the yield of the r1ver . . . . as it would
have been under similar periqds of time in previous similar years. ' '
Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Decree state as follows:
"8. Tl.e computations of the volun1e of
water to b ~ so delivered by applicants at said
Kingston 1\~easuring Station on said South Fork
of the Sevier River are to be ·based on the following volumer~ and periods of time (all at said
l{ingston Measuring Station on the South Fork
of said Sevr~r River) :
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(i) The volume of river yield for the threemonth period March 16 to June 15, normally a
period of high river yield, and

. (2) The volumes ,for the three-n1onth period
June 16 to September 15, normally a period of low
water yield, a.nd
.
.
(3) The volumes for the two-month period
September 16 to November 14.
'' 9. And said applicants (plaintiffs) are
hereby charged with the .duty of enforcing the
conditions under which these applications are
approved.''
No provision at all is made for the selection of
any ''similar period of time'' for the winter months.
Paragraph 6 of the Judgment and Decree states that
during the period from November 15th to March 15th
the respondents cannot divert water and store it at tho
same time except upon the consent of the Sevier Water
Commissioners. Nothing is said about delivering at
Ringston any water during the winter months.· At the
close of the argument Mr. Dudley Crafts asked the
court (R. 1121):
''MR. CRAFTS: Just one question and that
is: Do you make any distinrtion between the
winter months and summer, v. hy the same provisions shouldn't be required in the winter that
you make in the ~ummer~ That is, that they
should deliver at the Kingston ineasuring station
the same amount that we would have received
before the applications were rr ade ~
''THE COURT : I don't k1 ow whether I can
answer that or not, but I '11 attempt it. I'm fear-
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ful it will have some holes shot in it perhaps in
this v~ry room in a few months. But, gentlemen,
as I see it, if there are any rights to modify
decreed rights in a statutory adjudication, then
certainly those rights under our method of living
and being in these Rocky ~ountains, must look·
to the winter time for storage. So, Mr. Crafts,
all I can say to you is that this court feels that
some change of-use was and is contemplated under
the Cox Decree, and the court has less hesitation
about interferring with the so-called ves.ted rights
by permitting a. freer and more liberal storage
during the winter months than it would dare attempt to do in the other months of the year. I
admit that's rather weak reasoning, but it's in
the record for what it ;s worth.'' (Emphasis
·added)
So the Jones Decree is silent as to how or whom should
see that the flow of the river is not diminished during the
winter. ''A freer and more liberal storage (by respondents) during the winter months" is sanctioned by
the decree. And so far as any specific expression
in the Decree is concerned, this might mean the storage
of all winter flow.
If any dispute should arise between the River Commissioners and the respondents concerning the amount
of water that appellants are to receive:
'' .... such dispute shall be referred by either or
both of said parties to the State Engineer who
shall (in aid of the court) summarily determine
such question, using the formula set out. in this
and the following paragraph of this Decree.''
(Emphasis added-paragraph 7 of the Judgment
and Decree)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

83
The unmistakable ,meaning of this language is that
appellants' vested rights are no longer to be determined
according to the Cox Decree. They are now measured
by the instant Judgment and Decree. This adjudication of water rights is clearly erroneous~
Respondents' rights were enlarged; appellants'
rights were diminished and the determination of the volume of water that appellants shoud receive was vested in
the respondents after the court had stated several times
during the proceedings that all it would ·do would be
to approve or repect the appli~ations. (R. 10, 11). The
court was fully apprised of the law stated in Eardley
v. Terry and United States v. District Court, supra.
The Judgment and Decree in this case states that
vested rights will not be impaired if the change applications are granted, and at the same time the Decree
determines, and say~ in plain language that the appellants are not entitled to the water which they have heretofore appropriated and received! Paragraph 7 of the
amended Conclusions of Law (Judgment Roll, 68) states
that the water delivered to the Kingston measuring station shall be in an amount:
''. . . . at least equal to the average volume of
the same period ( wnseasonable floods and
'breaks' excluded) of snow, and rain; said computation to be based on a volume for the said
period and not as of any particular day, disaster
or other unseasonable heavy flows of water excepted." (Emphasis added)
·
In choosing the amount of flow for the previous ''similar
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period of time'' by which appelhints' rights are to be
measured, tlie resporidents may deduct airy water which
passed Kingston due to ''bifeaks'' (in diversion dams),
''diaste~" or other ''unseasonable heavy flows of water.
For instance, respondents may choose the three-month
~eriod June

i6 to September i5 for the year 1945

as the shnilar period of tiine to govern the flow
~f water that should be delivered at Kingston for these

same months in 1956. But if the. respondents can recall
a ''heavy unseasonable flow'' during the summer of
1945, this amount may be deducted from the 1956 determined flow at Kingston under the Jones Decree.
The 1945 flood water was received at the Piute reservoir and became either storage water or it may have
gone to the primary users in ·Sevier Valley. But the
Jones Decree says this water never did belong to these
ap:Pelhints. This adjudication of water rights has been
made in an appeal from a decision of the State Engineer
rejecting the proposed changes sought by respondents.
This is an adjudication that the appropriations made
by lower primary users, appellants herein, in 1860 and
appropriations of the unused waters of the River made
by the appellant storage companies between 1902 and
1912 are nullified and rescinded. It means that respondents' paper title to water which ··for the past
thirty years has never been diverted, nor used may now
be asserted and exercised. Such an adjudication in this
proceeding is not only contrary to the doctrine of
Eardley v. Terry and U.S. v. District Court supra but
i

I!·

'

·

I

'
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is also opposed to the Cox Decree and the Utah statutes.
The Cox Decree awarded any and all water in any way
accumulated in said reservoirs in excess of primary
rights to the storage companies. In accordance therewith the storage companies have collected and impounded
the ''unseasonable heavy flows of water" which could
not be used by the primary users. This water has been
appropriated and used by the appellant s.tora~e companies and constitutes their vested decreed right. Section 73-1-3, U.C.A. 1953 provides:
.

.

;l

'

''Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and ~he limit of all rights to use the waters
in this state."
As pointed out at page 42 of this brief (De'fini'tion and
Determination of the Vested Rights of Respondents),
the respondents have no right to water which they have
never used. The trial court did not have jurisdiction
in the first plac~ to adjudicate water rights in this pro~eeding, and in exceeding its jurisdiction and taking
water belonging to appellants and awarding it to respondents, the court erred in its determination of such
rights.
POINT· 6
THE DECREE IS ARBITRARY AND UNCONSCIONABLE AND THE fORMULA ADO.PTED BY THE . TRIAL
COURT IS WITHOUT SUPPORT IN THE EVIDENCE. THE
FI~DINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DECREE ARE UNINTELLIGIBLE AND CONFLICTING
AND IMPOSSIBLE OF PROPER CONSTRUCTION AND
nETERMINATION.

There is nd testimony in the record, nor legal basis
whatsoever to support the trial court's selection of two
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three-month periods and one two-month period during
the summer months as the comparable periods of time
to determine how much water shall pass the Kingston
Gaging Station. The designation of periods of time for
the summer months but complete omission of any p·rovisions guaranteeing the same flow of winter water to the
lower reservoirs to fill the storage rights is without
any reasonable explanation except that more liberal tampering with the storage rights is permitted. The periods
of time picked by the trial court are: (1) March 15 to
June 15, (2) June 16 to September 15, and (3) September 16 to November 15. These arbitrarily selected periods of time do not coincide with any of' the times set
forth in the Cox Decree. Some of the Sevier County
primary rights (Page 3 of the Cox Deeree) commence
on April 1st and last until September 30th. Others have
their period of use from April 1st to November 25th
(Elsinore Bench Irrigation Co.) or April 1st to April
30th and October 1st to October 15th. (Sevier Valley
C-anal Co.
The Jones Decree permits the respondents t.o
manipulate the size of the stream flowing past Kingston
in such a manner that very little water, if any, may be
received on certain days while torrential floods may be
allowed to entirely pass on down to lower users and
in the space of one or two weeks, the entire 3-nlonth
quota of appellants will be fulfilled. Appellants don't
even have the assurance that a fair and impartial river
commissioner will see that such an arbitrary thing will
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not occur. The arbitrary and unconscionable effects of
the Jones Decree will be as varied and diverse as is
the number of lower users, each with their different
specified time of use. (R. 504) This system of each
lower user depending on the return flow of an upper
appropriator's USE that is now well established under
the Cox Decree has been altered and materially renounced.
Consideration of these effects in the change of time
of return flow prompted the State Engineer to find:
"Because of the periods fixed by stipulation
and decree, the time of return flow is important
and any change will upset the system as it has
been operating for many years." (State Engineer's Ex. No. 1)
Why the trial court summarily selected these periods
of time in its determination of the flow past Kingston
will always be a mystery to app-ellants.
During the month of January, as shown by plaintiffs' Exhibit G, (reproduced at page ____ of this brief)
the flow at Kingston has varied from 85.2 cubic second
feet (1949) to 195 cubic se·cond feet (1942). During the
month of May the flow has varied at Kingston from
52.5 feet (1940) and 34.7 feet (1946) to 775 feet (1941)
and 521 feet (1942). These figures illustrate the wide
variation in flow at Kingston and the great latitude
which is allowed respondents in choosing and selecting
some ''similar periods of time in previous similar
years''. The Jones Decree is not at all clear on just
how the computation of the flow at Kingston is t.o be
arrived at. In Finding No. 21 it is stated:
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''. . . . that a reasonaply accurate computation
of such future flow can be made, taking the
average comparable month or s·eason of years of
similar amount of snow fali water content and
precipitation, disaster and unusual flood waters
excepted.'' ( J udgmerit Roll 55)
NO record has been kept of the amount of water which
has passed Kingston which could be classified as un-tisual flood waters or :teaching Kingston by reasons of
disiister. Paragraph 1 of the amended Conclusions of
Law states that respondents should deliver to the Kingston Gaging Station.

" .... a volume of water in an amount at least
equal to the average volume of the same period
(unseasonable floods and 'breaks' e~cluded) of
s:tt"ow, and rain; said computation to be based on
a volume for the said peribd and not as of any
particular day, . . . ' '
These different provisions are conflicting and impossible
of determinati9~·. There is no such thing as an average
comparable month. There might be a month with a
similar snow fall and water content and a "genii"
might anticipate· the temperatures which ·control snow
melt and the rate o£ runoff in the spring time, but any
average for the volume·· of flow past the Kingston Station would be vastly different from the comparable flow
for any previous similar month. And what does Finding 21 mean when it says: ''taking the average comparable month or season of years''' Does this permit
respondents to take any average comparable month
or in the alternative, and at their option a season of
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years as a basis for determining the future flow past
Kingston~

The ten-year average flow past Kingston

for the month of June has been 164.5 monthly mean
second feet, but within that ten-year period of time the
flo'v has varied from 9.2 ·cubic second feet (1946) tq
481 cubic second feet (1941). It would be impossible
for respondents to deliver at Kingston in each montl~
the average flow that has been received there over
the past ten years. There will be future years in wh~ch
the Sevie~ River does not produce an average flow of
water. In such years there would be no humanly possible way for respondents to produce the necessary water
to make up the average flow. In any event respondents
are not entitled to the flow of the river that exceeds
the average flov1. By specifying the three-month periods,
March 16 to June 15 and June 16 to September 15 the
Decree further complicates the problem and thus enlarges the margin of leeway allowed respondents in
determining what the flow of the river at the Kingston
Gaging Station shall be.
The Supreme Court must k~ep in mind that the
vested rights of appellants is to receive the same amount
of water that they have in the past and that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate water rights in
holding that appellants are not entitled to receive ''unseasonable heavy flows of water". The administering
of the Jones Decree in a manner satisfactory to appellants is utterly impossible. Appellants' crops may ''burn
up'' for lack of wat~r in August but respondents will

1f
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contend that they delivered their three-month quota
by the middle of September. Delivery at this later
period of time will nevertheless impair appellants'
vested rights. Appellants contend that the trial court
in this proceeding lacked jurisdiction to change or mod(ify the terms of the Cox Decree and therefore they are
entitled to the same amount of water that they have
been accustomed to receiving under that Decree. If the
appellants were to sue the respondents for damages for
failure to deliver the amount of water to which they
are entitled under the Cox Decree, the problem would
resolve itself into a battle of experts. A jury would
have to resolve the conflicting testimony as to how
much water appellants would have received in the event
that respondents had not stored water and had not
irrigated 5000 new acres of land. The ''ratio decidendi''
of the Jones Decree is that respondents cannot achieve
their proposed changes without impairing appellants
vested rights. The future litigation that is threatened
by respondents' attempt to proceed under the Jones
Decree is limitless. And yet the court decided that:
''it should in effect open the gates so as to permit
the construction of not only this, ·but I gather
from the evidence, oth~r applications which are
or \vill be filed." (R. 1118)
POINT 7
THE DECREE IS ERRONEOUS IN THAT IT IS ADMINISTRATIVELY UNWORKABLE.
\\~ritten

by the Attorney General for State F~ngin0er.
The scope of this Point is limited to a di!.-'eussion of
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the findings, conclusions and decree as they affect the
administration of the Sevier River by the State Engineer. Substantive rules of water law and the rights
of these litigants thereunder are not here considered.
It is sought to be demonstrated that a river commissioner cannot administer the distribution of the water
of the Sevier River in accordance with the ,Plan incorporated in the lower court's decree and that it was error
for the lower court to relieve or attempt to relieve the
State Engineer of any of his statutory duties relative
to the administration of the waters of this state.
It is not clear from the findings whose duty the
lower court deemed it to be to see to it that the decree
is carried out. Finding number 19 contains this language:
" .... but in view of the fact that the applicants
propose, in addition to setting up an on-call system at Hatch, to also irrigate new lands in Garfield County and to level and otherwise modernize the farm lands in Piute and Garfield Counties, all of which would ordinarily entail a very
complicated situation insofar as the distribution
of the water of the South Fork of the Sevier
River is concerned and that the State Engineer
and the water commissioner should not be charged
with the direct responsibility of seeing to it that
the defendants get their full water rights at
Kingston Station on the South Fork of the
Sevier River between 16 March and 14 November,
inclusive, of each year while plaintiffs operate
under said applications, but that duty should be
charged to Plaintiffs as a condition to the approval of their several applications.''
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Uta:q. ~tatute~ ~d cases ~~~a.l!lY ~p.dicate th~t the
respon~ibility anq d11t-y of a,~inisteJing th~ rivers o~
this state lie~ with the State Engi~~er. The decree
itself and part~cularly paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof hereinafter set forth, does provide that the State Engineer
in aid of the court shall summ~rily dispose of any
disputes between the river commissioner~ and the plaintiffs. We submit, however, that the findings, conclusions and decree, considered as a whole, attempt to relieve the State Engineer of at least a part of his stat~
tory duties and to impose those duties on the plaintiffs, and to this extent we believe that the lower court
has committed error.
A more important objection tQ the lower court's
decree is the formula for water distribution created by
the decree. The d~cree provi4es in paragraphs 7 and 8:
"7. That the approval of said application i~
further conditioned as follows: That during the
eight-month period from March 16th of each year
to November 14th of each year, at such times
as the applicants, or any of them, are either
storing all, or a portion of their water in the
reservoir or applying water to the lands as provided in applications No. a-2371, a-2372, a-2373,
the yield of the river at Kingston measuring station on the South Fork of the Sevier River shall
be maintained as it would have been under sin1ilar
periods of time (see paragraph 8 below) in previous similar years. All available information concerning conditions of water shed, snow cover,
rainfall infiltration runoff, te1nperature, and
other pertinent factors shall be eonsidered in
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making the determination of the river yield at
Kingston Measuring Station on the South Fork of
the Sevier River. And should any dispute arise
between the River Commissioners and the plaintiffs concerning the amount of water to be above
specified, such dispute shall be referred by either
or both of said parties to the State Engineer who
shall (in aid of the court) summarily determine
such question, using the formula set out in this
and the following paragraph of this Decree.
''8. The computations of the volume of water
to be so delivered by applicants at said Kingston
Measuring Station on said South Fork of the
Sevier River are to be based on the following
volumes and periods of time (all at said Kingston
Measuring Station on the South Fork of said
Sevier River) :
(1) The volume of river yield for the threemonth period March 16 to June 15, normally a
period of high river yield, and
(2) The volumes for the three-month period
June 16 to September 15, normally a· period of
low water yield, and
(3) The volumes for the two-month period
September 16 to November 14.''
f mplicit in the decree is an apparent recognition that

the Hatch Town project cannot go forward at the expense of a taking of water rights of users of the lower
part of the river system. In an attempt to obviate
such damage, it is provided that a certain yield of
water must, between certain time intervals, flow past
the Kingston Gaging Station, the point in the river
which geographically divides the applicants from the
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protes~ants. -The paragraphs quoted above set forth

the amounts of water and the periods of time determined
upon by the court. Briefly. summarized, it is provided
th-at the yield at Kingston shall remain '' ... be maintained as it would have been under similar periods of
time (see pa:ragraph 8 below) in previous similar years.''
The specified periods are : first, M·arch 16-June 15, second, June 16-September ~5 ; third, September 16-Novenlber 14. Disputes, if any, are to.be.determined summarily
by the State Engineer in aid of the Court.

.

.

The flow of a river depends upon many factors, some
of which are depth of snow cover; water content of
snow ; time incidences at which the seasons commence;
abruptness or gradualness of temperature changes from
season to ·season; absorptive qualities of the soil; wind
factors ; rain storms ; rainfall infiltration runoff; the
extent to which farmers along the river system deem
it desirable to us·e their decreed rights.
In listing such factors an attempt has been made
not to duplicate. Some of those listed, however, necessarily overlap in part. As an example, the absorptive
quality of soil is a complex factor which involves in
part soil physics which does not change materially from
year to year although there may be some change tf
different lands are irrigated and in part frost depth,
which of course in turn is dependent upon temperature
season incidence and soil moisture. And plainly the
factor of the extent to which a water user fully uses
his decreed rights is a factor \v·hieh depends upon several
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of the others listed (e.g., rainfall) in additio~ to the
irrigation practices and psychological makeup of the
particular water user involved. Actually there are other
factors, and those together with the ones listed combine
and interrelate in such a way that an infinite number
of combinations become possible. Run-off in a drainage
system depends also to a large extent upon conditions
created by the fall and winter of the previous year. ..A.
long cold fall which makes for deep ground frost, followed by a short winter of deep snows, followed by a
suddenly warm springtime, combine to make for a
short, heavy, early run-off. If but one of these factors
is varied, the result is a variance of the quantity of the
run-off, a variance of its peak intensity, a variance of
the time at which the peak comes and a varian·ce of
length of time that run-off continues. Records of river
yield at the Kingston Gaging Station kept for forty
years indicate that there has been no year in that
whole period of time which can be considered to be similar to another year.
The choice of the ''previous similar years '' will
be, therefore, largely guess work, and, of course, it is
a guess wltich in its nature can never be demonstrated
to have been correct or incorrect. Grave dissatisfaction
among the users of water ~f the Sevier River, where
water is as important as it is anywhere in this state
or in the west, is inevitable. It is submitted that a
proper decree should not only protect vested rights:
a proper decree is one which can be demonstrated to
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be correct so that a water user whose livelihood depends
upon protection of his rights will have some confidence
in the statutory system of water administration.
Another difficulty with which the river commissioner would be faced lies in an ambiguity in the
language of the decree which requires that the river
yield at Kingston be "maintained as it would have been
under similar periods of time . . . in previous similar
years.'' A serious problem is whether the ''similar
periods'' must all be taken from whatever ''previous
similar year'' was chosen by the river commissioner at
the outset of the irrigation season. The situation can perhaps be better illustrated by example: Assume that the
river commissioner, early in the year 1956, decided
that perhaps 1931 is the best choice for the previous
''similar'' year. Near the close of the first period
(March 16-June 15 ), his records show that not enough
water has passed Kingston and he therefore requires
that the applicants release more water, so that by June
15th the 1931 figure for the first period is reached.
There arises then the problem whether, for the second
period, the commissioner may or must alter his plan
so as to adopt for the second period, the year, say, 1939,
which now appears to be more nearly "similar" in the
light of the course of the spring weather.
The farmers who irrigate with Sevier River water
can be divided into groups with adverse interest. IJitigants grouped together in this case as protestants in
many ways havP opposing interests: the storage rights
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represented for example, are benefited at the expense
of diversion rights if river yield is very high very early.
This means, of course, that it is not enough for tlie
State Enginee:t; to see to it that a fair quantity of water
passes the Kingston Gaging Station. To avoid injustices,
and litigation, the administrative officer in charge o:f
the river must also see to it that the time factor is
strictly observed and that the right quantity of water
--flows past Kingston at exactly the right time.
It may appear on casual reading that the difficulties
suggested here are imagined or manufactured.. However,
it is a fact which coun'Sel for the State Engineer
are keenly aware of, that it is peculiarly difficult to
present with clarity a picture of the administrative
problem with which that office is faced. These objections
are not frivolously tendered. And more is involved in
such a problem as is here presented than the potential
embarrassment of a public office; for an attempt to
solve with fairness a problem to which there is no
solution is certain to result in dissatisfaction and endless litigation. It is obvious that, should the decree be
affirmed, as each ''similar quarterly period'' nears its
close, the office of the State Engineer will be the recipient of suggestions, pressures, and· expressions of discontent from water users up and down the river. This
is inevitable on a river system as mature and as overappropriated as is the Sevier.
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CONCLUSION
In Eardley vs. Terry, et al., 94 Utah 367, 77 P. 2d
362, and United States vs. District Court (Utah 1951)
238 P. 2d 1132, this court stated :
''All that the district court or this court on
appeal from the district court is called upon to
do is to determine whether the application should
be rejected or approved.'' (Emphasis added)
And thus appellants contend that because of the errors
outlined in this brief, the district court's Judgment and
Decree should be reversed and the decision of the State
Engineer reinstated.
The respondents under the guise of seeking a:
''change-application'' have attempted to appropriate
additional amounts of water which have never before
been needed or used by them. Their proposal to store
winter rights, (now non-consumptive) for summer use
on the same lands and to irrigate 5000 new acres far
removed from the river where the water will be completely consumed, cannot operate without impairing the
vested rights of lower users. The Cox Decree, which
after 17 years of administration by the water commissioners now functions so well, will be rescinded insofar as its principles of TIME and USE have heretofore
applied to respondents.
The present record conclusively indicates that appellants vested rights will be impaired if respondents proceed in accordance ~th their applications to develop
and irrigate the 5000 new acres besides storing winter
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water for use in the summer months on lands for which
they now have a sufficient summer right. The State
Engineer's decision in rejecting respondents' applications should be reinstated and the Decree of the trial
court reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
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